The  Humanizing  of  the  Brute 


OR 


The  Essential  Difference  between  the  Human  and 

Animal   Sowl   proved  from  their 

Specific  Activities 


BY 
H.  MUCKERMANN,  S.  T. 

WITH  FIVE  PLATES 


St.  Louis,  Mo.,  and  Freiburg,   (Baden) 

Published  by  B.  HERDER 
1906 


NIHIL  OBSTAT. 
S.  Ludovici,  die  4.  Sept.  1906. 


IMPRIMATUR. 
S.  Ludovici,  die  6.  Sept.  1906. 

JOANNES  J.  GLENNON, 
Archiepiscopus  Sti.  Ludovici. 


To 

THE  REV.  ERIC  W ASM  ANN,  S.J., 
this  little  volume 

is 
gratefully  dedicated. 


"Und  was  man  tst, 
das  blitb  man  andern  schuldig." 
Goethe. 


CONTENTS. 


Chapter  i.  The  Humanizing  of  the  Brute 

PART  I. 

Instinct  and  Intelligence  differ  essentially. 

Chapter  n.         Instinct  and  Final  Tendency    . 

Chapter  in.  Instinct  and  Consciousness  of 
Finality  .... 

Chapter  iv.  Instinct  and  Sensuous  Cogni- 
tion   

Chapter  v.          Instinct   and  Sense-Experience 

Chapter  vi.        Instinct  and  Intelligence  . 

PART  II. 
Animals  have  no  Intelligence. 

Chapter  vn.       The    "Intelligence"    of    "The 

Lower  Animals" 
Chapter  vni.  The  "Intelligence"  of  "The 

Higher  Animals" 
CONCLUSION 


NOTE:  — The  author  is  indebted  to  the  Rev.  Fr.  John  J.  Wynne,  S.  J., 
Editor  of  the  Messenger,  and  to  the  Editor  of  the  Scientific  American 
for  their  kind  permission  to  make  use  of  several  papers  which  origi- 
nally appeared  in  their  periodicals. 


CHAPTER  I. 
The  Humanizing  of  the  Brute. 

T  T  is  a  well-known  fact  that  in  the  homes  of  the 
"upper  ten  thousand"  special  servants  in  charge 
of  animal  pets  play  an  important  part.  It  is  the  in- 
teresting duty  of  these  favored  mortals  to  rouse  the 
lovely  poodles,  pugs,  and  pussies  from  pleasant  slum- 
bers, to  attend  to  their  toilet  and  attire,  to  take  them 
out  for  a  drive  on  bright  and  sunny  days,  or  lead  them 
a-promenading  down  a  cool  and  shady  avenue,  and, 
last  not  least,  to  dance  humble  attendance  upon  their 
charges  when  feasting  at  a  lordly  and  luxurious  table. 
Houses  of  refuge  and  asylums  for  orphaned  cats  have 
been  erected  at  Berlin,  and  it  was  reported  from  Paris 
that  at  the  time  of  the  last  exposition  a  cemetery  for 
dogs,  cats,  birds,  and  other  domestic  animals  had  been 
opened.  This  city  of  the  dead,  with  its  resplendent 
monuments  in  honor  of  the  noble  departed,  is  said  to 
rival  a  fairy-palace  in  beauty.  Indeed,  as  J.  G.  Hol- 
land expresses  his  sentiments  in  very  pathetic  terms  to 
his  "dear  dog  Blanco:" 

"I  look  into  your  great,  brown  eyes, 
Where  love  and  loyal  homage  shine, 

And  wonder  where  the  difference  lies 
Between  your  soul  and  mine 

(7) 


8  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

I  clasp  your  head  upon  my  breast — 

The  while  you  whine  and  lick  my  hand — 
And  thus  our  friendship  is  confessed 

And  thus  we  understand. 
Ah,  Blanco!    Did  I  worship  God 

As  truly  as  you  worship  me, 
Or  follow  where  my  Master  trod 

With  your  humility: 
Did  I  sit  fondly  at  his  feet 

As  you  dear  Blanco  sit  at  mine, 
And  watch  him  with  a  love  as  sweet, 

My  life  would  grow  divine." 

These  few  but  telling  facts  furnish  a  striking  illus- 
tration of  the  senseless  mania  of  regarding  the  animal 
as  a  brother  of  man,  his  equal  in  nature  aud  essence. 
Indeed,  the  intelligence  of  animals  is  almost  universally 
defended  by  modern  naturalists.  Some  of  them,  as 
Buechner,  Eimer,  Marshall,  and  a  host  of  others, 
whom  Prof.  W.  M.  Wheeler  justly  styles  "popular- 
izers,"  ascribe  even  to  animals  as  low  as  ants  a  high 
degree  of  mental  activity,  in  some  respects  superior  to 
that  of  man.  Others,  as  A.  Bethe  and  Uexkuell, 
maintain  that  only  the  higher  animals,  such  as  dogs, 
are  endowed  with  intelligence,  whilst  the  lower  ones, 
as  for  instance  insects,  are  mere  reflex  machines,  desti- 
tute of  all  psychic  qualities.  Others,  finally,  as  Em- 
ery, Forel,  Morgan,  Romanes,  Peckham  and  so  forth, 
attribute  intelligence  to  all  animals  without  exception, 
but  add  that  this  intelligence,  though  not  differing  in 
quality  from  that  of  man,  is  infinitely  inferior  to  it  in  de~ 
gree.  Only  a  few,  such  as  Wasmann  and  Wundt,  are 
convinced  that  there  is  no  trace  of  true  intelligence, 
either  in  the  lower  or  in  the  higher  animals.  Prof. 
Wheeler  seems  to  hold  that  there  is  no  evidence  of 


THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE.  9 

ratiocination  in  animals.  It  is  true,  he  ascribes  what 
he  calls  "simple  intelligence"  to  animals,  and  main- 
tains that  this  term  implies  "choice  on  the  part  of  the 
individual  organism."  *)  But  his  term  "choice" 
can  hardly  mean  choice  in  as  far  as  it  supposes  the 
abstract  comparison  of  two  objects.  For  he  declares 
with  reference  to  ants  '  'that  there  are  no  evidences  of 
anything  resembling  abstract  thought,  cognition  or 
ratiocination  as  manifested  in  man."  2)  Prof.  Ed- 
ward L,.  Thorndike  of  Columbia  University  is  a  de- 
cided adversary  of  animal  intelligence.  After  a  most 
careful  examination  of  the  question,  he  "failed  to  find 
any  act  that  even  seemed  due  to  reasoning, "  3 )  and 
that  "even  after  leaving  reason  out  of  account,  there 
are  tremendous  differences  between  man  and  the  higher 
animals."  4) 

But  abstracting  from  such  few  authors  the  late  zoo- 
logist Prof.  A.  S.  Packard  is  correct  when  he  states: 
"Those  naturalists  who  observe  most  closely  (?)  and 
patiently  the  habits  of  animals  do  not  hesitate  to  state 
their  belief  that  animals,  and  some  more  than  others, 
possess  reasoning  powers  which  differ  in  degree  rather 

l~)  "The  Compound  and  Mixed  Nests  of  American  Ants," 
The  American  Naturalist,  Vol.  XXXV.  (1901),  p.  809. 

2)  I.e.,  p.  813. 

3)  "Animal    Intelligence;  an  Experimental  Study  of  the 
Associative   Processes   in   Animals."      Series   of  Monograph 
Supplements  to  Psychological  Review  Vol.   II.,  No.  4,  June, 
1898,  p.  46. 

4)  1.  c.,  p.  87.     Thorndike,  at  times,    speaks  of  animals  as 
if  he  ascribed  intelligence  to  them.     But,  in  reality,  he  means 
nothing  else  than  what  we  would  call  "plastic  instinct." 


10  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

than  in   kind    from    the    purely    intellectual    acts   of 
man."    J) 

Now  upon  investigation  into  the  cause  underlying 
this  erroneous  principle  we  might,  as  far  as  the  more 
popular  circles  are  concerned,  discover  one  reason  in 
the  nervous  sentimentalism  of  our  days.  At  the  be- 
ginning of  the  twentieth  century,  no  less  than  towards 
the  end  of  the  eighteenth,  people  have  become  ex- 
tremely sensitive  to  any  sort  of  pain.  Pain  like  a 
haunting  spectre  is  dreaded  with  the  utmost  anxiety 
and  avoided  even  to  a  nicety;  and  since  the  human 
heart  is  inclined  to  find  some  correspondence  between 
external  circumstances  and  its  own  apprehensions  and 
emotions,  it  kindles  in  sympathy  wherever  pain  is  no- 
ticed, whether  real  or  imaginary.  This  inclina- 
tion will  grow  stronger  as  soon  as  there  is  question  of 
animated  beings  that  are  attached  to  man  and  afford 
him  sensuous  pleasure,  and  leave  upon  him  the  im- 
pression of  a  certain  helplessness.  Of  course,  as  is 
attested  by  daily  experience,  one  of  the  first  and  fore- 
most places  among  such  cherished  creatures  must  be 
assigned  to  the  animals  known  as  our  "domestic  com- 
panions." Besides  there  exists  a  certain  analogy  be- 
tween the  manifestations  of  pain  in  man  and  in  the 
brute,  between  the  expression  of  man's  spiritual  affec- 
tions and  the  corresponding  merely  sensuous  feelings 
indicated  in  the  features  of  animals.  Thus  it  hap- 
pens that  from  the  expression  visible  in  the  eye  of  a 
faithful  dog  the  inference  is  drawn,  not  to  an  empty 
stomach,  but  rather  to  a  heart  oppressed  by  sorrow 

•)A.  S.   Packard,  M.  D.  Ph.  D.,  Zoology    (10th  ed.)  p. 
680. 


THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE.  11 

and  even  weariness  of  life.  In  other  words,  it  is  from 
sheer  sentimentality  that  the  spiritual  affections  prop- 
er to  man  alone  are  under  similar  circumstances 
attributed  to  animals;  hence  it  follows  that  a  genuine 
consciousness  of  pain,  presupposing  reason  and  intel- 
lect, is  ascribed  to  them. 

"Human  folk,"  says  Thorndike  in  his  admirable 
monograph  on  animal  intelligence,  "are  as  a  matter  of 
fact  eager  to  find  intelligence  in  animals.  They  like 
to.  And  when  the  animal  observed  is  a  pet  belonging 
to  them  or  their  friends,  or  when  the  story  is  one  that 
has  been  told  as  a  story  to  entertain,  further  implica- 
tions are  introduced. "  l ) 

A  second  reason  for  this  universal  anthropomor- 
phism is  touched  upon  by  Peckham  when  he  speaks 
"of  the  futility  of  any  attempt  to  understand  the 
meaning  of  the  actions  of  animals  until  one  has  be- 
come well  acquainted  with  their  life  habits. "  2)  Many 
animal  actions,  to  all  appearances,  bear  such  traces  of 
intelligence  that  they  are  almost  involuntarily  attri- 
buted to  an  intellectual  principle.  A  more  careful 
examination  and  comparison  with  other  actions 
of  the  same  animal  will  soon  convince  us  of  our 
error. 

"Thousands  of  cats  on  thousands  of  occasions,  sit 
helplessly  yowling,  and  no  one  takes  thought  of  it; 
but  let  one  cat  claw  at  the  knob  of  a  door,  supposedly  as 
asignal  to  be  let  out,  and  straightway  this  cat  becomes 
the  representative  of  the  cat-mind  in  all  the  books. 

')  Thorndike,  1.  c.,  p.  4. 

2)  G.  W.  Peckham  and  E.  G.  Peckham.     Oil  the  Instincts 
and  Habits  of  the  Solitary  Wasps,  Madison,  1898,  p.  230. 


12  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

The  unconscious  distortion  of  the  facts  is  almost  harm- 
less compared  to  the  unconcious  neglect  of  an  animal's 
mental  life  until  it  verges  on  the  unusual  and  marvel- 
lous."1) 

The  defective  philosophical  training  and  superficial 
education,  so  prevalent  in  our  times,  suggest  a  third 
reason  for  this  mania  of  ascribing  intelligence  to  ani- 
mals. Ever  since  the  destructive  attempts  of  Kant 
and  his  disciples  to  shake  and  shatter  the  realms  of 
ideas,  the  true  object  of  philosophy  is  ignored  and 
lost.  The  noble  queen,  the  exalted  offspring  of  etern- 
al wisdom,  has  been  stripped  of  her  royal  dignity;  and 
while  ruthless  hands  have  snatched  the  crown  from 
off  her  head,  she  has  "been  degraded  to  be  the 
cringing  handmaid  of  experimental  science.  And 
what  was  the  unavoidable  result?  That  very  soon  the 
principles  of  the  old  and  sound  philosophy  fell  into 
contempt,  whilst  in  their  stead  there  rose  a  confus- 
ion and  obscurity  of  ideas  which  oftentimes  led  to  the 
defense  of  most  obvious  errors  permeating  certain 
branches  of  science.  Thus  our  modern  psychology,  as 
upheld  by  many  of  its  advocates,  is  a  veritable  monstro- 
sity. Wundt  can  not  refrain  from  blaming  mod- 
ern psychology  for  its  "premature  application  of  no- 
tions insufficiently  determined"  and  for  its  "ignor- 
ance of  systematic  psychological  methods. ' '  Thus  he 
explains  the  fact  "that  the  psychic  processes  of 
brutes  are  not  taken  for  what  they  appear  in  imme- 
diate and  unprejudiced  observation,  but  that  the  ob- 
server's reflections  are  transferred  to  the  animal.  If 
any  vital  action  has  the  appearance  of  possibly 

1 )  Thorndike,  1.  c.  p.  4. 


THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE.  13 

being  the  result  of  a  number  of  reasonings  and 
conclusions,  this  is  taken  as  a  cogent  proof  that  such 
reasoning  and  conclusion  actually  occurred.  And 
thus  all  the  psychic  activity  is  resolved  into  logical 
reflections. " x ) 

The  above  mentioned  reasons,  however,  do  not 
offer  us  the  final  and  fundamental  explanation  for  the 
persistent  tendency  of  assigning  a  difference  between 
man  and  animal,  not  of  kind  but  of  degree. 

The  assumption  of  animal  intelligence,  as  every 
other  error,  is  essentially  rooted  in  the  will.  It  does 
not  require  much  depth  or  breadth  of  intellect  to  see 
that  the  humanizing  of  the  brute  is  a  mere  corollary 
of  materialistic  evolution.  Materialism  denies  the 
existence  of  a  vital  principle  apart  from  matter,  and 
maintains  that  life  is  merely  the  resultant  of  attracting 
and  repelling  forces.  Everything,  therefore,  is  pure 
matter,  and  there  can  be  no  essential  difference  be- 
tween the  animal  soul  and  that  of  man,  since  neither 
can  exist  independently  of  matter.  But  if  there  is  no 
essential  difference  between  the  animating  principles 
of  man  and  brute,  why  assume  any  between  the  facul- 
ties and  manifestations  of  these  principles?  In  other 
words,  if  human  actions  are  guided  by  intelligence, 
the  same  holds  true  for  those  of  animals. 

It  follows  that  the  theory  of  animal  intel- 
ligence is  the  natural  outcome  of  materialism,  and  as 
such  must  be  traced  back  to  the  same  source  from 
which  materialism  ultimately  springs.  To  speak 
plainly,  the  first  promulgators  of  "animal  intelligence" 

1 )  W.    Wundt,    Vorlesungen    ueber    die   Menschen=und 
Tierseele,  3.  ed,  1897,  p.  387. 


14  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

and  those  "popularizers,"  as  Wheeler  justly  calls 
them,  who  now  uphold  it  with  such  tendentious  tenac- 
ity often  seem  to  have  no  other  purpose  in  view 
than  to  establish  a  theoretical  justification  for  des- 
cending practically  to  a  level  with  the  brute. 

These  reasons  we  believe  clearly  prove  the  deplor- 
able character  of  this  modern  tendency  which  aims  at 
leveling  the  difference  between  animal  and  man,  a 
tendency  which,  because  of  its  universality  and  the 
warm  support  it  receives,  calls  for  most  strenuous 
opposition. 

It  is  our  intention  to  contribute  in  some  small 
share  to  the  controversy,  and  to  prove  in  a  simple  and 
clear  manner  the  essential  difference  which  has  ever 
been  upheld  by  Catholic  philosophy  with  reference  to 
the  souls  of  man  and  brute.  Man  and  brute  belong  to 
two  different  realms  of  life,  separated  by  a  spanless 
chasm.  This  is  the  thesis  we  propose  to  the  consid- 
eration of  the  reader,  and  in  order  to  demonstrate  it, 
we  shall  confine  ourselves  to  the  specific  activities  of 
man  and  brute,  basing  our  entire  argumentation  on 
the  following  simple  syllogism: 

True  instinct  and  intelligence  * )  differ  essentially. 
Now  the  brute  possesses  merely  instinct  and  no  trace  of 
intelligence.  Therefore  man  and  brute  differ  essentially. 

In  the  first  part  of  the  essay  we  shall  develop 
the  concept  of  instinct,  then  explain  the  true 

*)  That  is  "rational  intelligence."  To  avoid  misunder- 
standings we  may  note  here  that  by  the  term  intelligence,  we 
always  mean  intelligence  in  its  proper  signification,  that  is 
rational  intelligence. 


THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE.  15 

criterion  which  invariably  separates  instinct  and  in- 
telligence, and  prove  that  this  criterion  involves  an 
essential  difference.  In  the  second  part  -we  shall 
make  use  of  the  criterion  established  and  prove  that 
there  is  no  trace  of  intelligence  in  animals. 


PART  I. 

INSTINCT  AND  INTELLIGENCE  DIFFER  ESSEN. 
TIALLY. 


CHAPTER  II. 
Instinct  and  Final  Tendency. 

'THE  views  of  scientific  men  on  the  nature  of  instinct 
and  instinctive  activity  are  so  widely  divergent  that 
any  endeavor  of  securing  general  acceptance  for  a  pre- 
cise definition  of  the  terms  seems  to  be  a  hopeless  task. 
Still  it  is  necessary  to  make  the  attempt;  for  without 
clear  definitions  and  premises  it  is  impossible  to  treat  a 
question  fairly  or  to  arrive  at  clear  conclusions.  The 
clear  sky  lies  beyond  the  clouds  and  the  haze  of  the 
atmosphere.  What,  then,  do  we  understand  by  in- 
stinct? Sense  experience  or  well  observed  facts,  and 
not  preconceived  ideas,  are  to  furnish  the  necessary 
data  from  which  we  determine  the  characteristics  act- 
ually common  to  all  instinctive  activity.  But  in 
appealing  to  facts  and  common  sense  it  is  well  to  re- 
main on  neutral  ground;  we  shall  restrict  our  present 
investigation  to  actions  that  are  not  and  cannot  be 
modified  by  any  experience  and  are  acknowledged 
alike  by  friend  and  foe  to  belong  to  the  category  ot 
instinctive  activity.  In  this  supposition  we  shall 
show  first  of  all  that  all  actions  proceeding  from  in- 
stinct necessarily  involve  a  final  tendency. 

(16) 


INSTINCT  AND  FINAL  TENDENCY.  17 

It  is  obvious  that  the  influence  of  "purpose,"  or  a 
final  tendency,  is  met  with  everywhere  in  the  universe. 
The  recognition  of  this  truth  is  forcibly  brought  home 
to  us  by  the  study  of  the  laws  of  inorganic  matter 
in  the  wonderful  cycle  of  carbon  in  the  realm  of  nature, 
the  numeric  proportions  according  to  which  atoms  com- 
bine and  separate,  the  peculiar  quality  of  water  in 
reaching  its  maximum  density  at  4°  C.  It  is  clearly 
demonstrated  by  the  laws  of  organic  life  in  general, 
and  especially  by  the  study  of  the  human  body,  its 
organs  and  functions,  the  eye,  the  heart,  the  circulation 
of  the  blood,  the  activity  of  brain  and  nerves.  But 
nowhere  is  the  recognition  of  final  tendency  demanded 
more  emphatically  than  in  the  explanation  of  the  act- 
ivity of  animals  which  originates  in  their  instinctive 
faculties.  Indeed,  we  meet  with  so  many  actions  ap- 
propriate to  specific  ends  that,  if  anywhere  in  nature, 
then  surely  in  the  domain  of  instinct,  "final  tendency' ' 
holds  the  sceptre  of  sovereignty. 

Countless  illustrations  offered  by  natural  history 
show  that  the  tendency,  which  is  characteristic  of  all 
instinctive  activity,  refers  to  the  preservation  of  the 
individual  animal  and  of  its  distinctive  species.  Con- 
sequently, there  are  three  principal  groups  of  instinc- 
tive actions:  those  which  refer  to  the  nutrition  of  the 
individual,  those  which  tend  to  its  defence,  and 
those  which  are  directed  toward  the  propagation 
of  the  species.  As  it  is  impossible  to  investigate 
every  instinctive  action  in  detail,  we  shall  con- 
fine our  study  to  these  three  groups,  and  we  shall 
find  abundant  evidence  to  prove  that  "final  tendency" 
is  an  essential  constituent  of  every  activity  that  is 
acknowledged  to  belong  to  the  realm  of  instinct. 


18  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

In  studying  the  first  group  of  instinctive  actions, 
those  by  which  animals  nourish  themselves  and  their 
progeny,  we  are  struck  by  two  main  facts:  the  peculiar 
fitness  of  the  nourishment  for  the  digestive  organs  of 
the  animal  and  the  appropriate  manner  in  which  it  is 
procured.  I^et  us  take  as  an  example  the  develop- 
ment of  the  beetle  Sitaris  humeralis  (muralis),  which 
has  been  so  admirably  described  by  the  French  natur- 
alist Fabre.  x)  In  its  first  larval  stage  this  interesting 
blister-beetle  of  the  family  of  the  Meloidae  cannot  live 
except  on  the  egg  of  a  bee,  whereas  the  indispensable 
food  of  the  second  stage  is  honey ,  which  would  have 
been  virulent  poison  to  the  beetle  in  its  earliest  exist- 
ence. The  following  organs  are  at  the  disposal  of  our 
beetle  to  secure  possession  of  the  egg:  six  strong  legs, 
well  adapted  for  climbing  and  clinging  to  other  objects, 
fully  developed  mandibles  and  feelers,  and  finally  good 
eyes.  But  after  the  transformation  of  the  first  larval 
stage  into  the  second,  the  wormlike  grub  is  blind 
and  has  almost  lost  its  legs  and  feelers,  but  is  endowed 
with  a  large  mouth  admirably  adapted  for  sipping  the 
honey  which  is  necessary  for  its  subsistence  in  this 
second  stage  of  development.  The  spot  where  Sitaris 
first  beholds  the  light  of  day  is  near  the  entrance  of 
the  bee's  habitation.  The  larva  is  hatched  toward  the 
end  of  September  or  early  in  October,  and  remains 
quietly  on  the  same  spot  throughout  the  winter  with- 
out any  food  until  the  bee  leaves  its  home  in  early 
spring.  Then  the  moment  for  action  has  arrived,  and 
it  is  highly  interesting  to  observe  how  our  beetle  pro- 
cures its  suitable  nourishment  in  the  most  appropriate 
manner. 

')  J.  H.  Fabre,  Nouveaux  Souvenirs  Entomologiqnes, 
Paris,  1882,  Vol.  II.,  p.  262. 


INSTINCT  AND  FINAL  TENDENCY.  19 

When  the  male-bees  are  about  to  leave  the  nest 
they  must  necessarily  pass  the  spot  where  our  little 
larva  has  patiently  lurked,  as  it  were,  for  six  months. 
It  seems  to  have  anticipated  this  fact,  and  when  the  bee 
unsuspectingly  approaches  the  entrance  of  the  nest, 
the  larva  vaults  with  the  greatest  ease  on  the  bee's 
back,  and  off  it  goes  on  an  interesting  journey  through 
the  beautiful  realm  of  new-born  spring.  But  at 
once  it  is  confronted  by  a  new  difficulty;  for  it  will 
never  succeed  in  finding  an  egg  on  the  back  of  the 
male-bee,  especially  as  the  latter  never  returns  to  the 
nest.  Yet  our  little  rider  knows  very  well  what  to  do. 
At  the  moment  when  the  male-bee  on  his  journey 
meets  the  female,  the  larva  swaps  horses,  and  having 
returned  to  the  nest  on  the  back  of  the  female,  slides 
along  the  drawn  out  abdomen  directly  onto  the  first 
egg  she  deposits  in  the  carefully  prepared  cell.  With 
the  usual  signs  of  satisfaction,  the  bee  then  closes  the 
cell,  in  which  the  embryo  bee  and  the  bold  intruder 
have  been  immured,  and  the  larva  can  now  consume 
the  egg  without  fear  of  disturbance.  Resting  on  the 
floating  island  of  "eggshells,"  it  passes  into  the  sec- 
ond stage  and  then  enjoys  the  sweet  honey  in  per- 
fect security  from  all  danger  for  the  following  stages 
of  its  extraordinary  metamorphosis. 

Not  less  remarkable  are  those  instinctive  actions  of 
animals  by  which  they  provide  for  their  defence  and 
propagation.  But  these  actions  must  not  be  separated 
from  the  circumstances  which  influence  their  perfor- 
mance. Indeed,  if  these  circumstances  were  always 
taken  into  consideration,  no  one  would  dare  affirm 
that  instinctive  actions  of  animals  are  inappropriate  in 


20  THK  HUMANIZING  OF  THB  BRUTE. 

their  nature,  though  sometimes  for  the  sake  of  a  high- 
er end  they  may  fall  short  of  their  immediate  purpose. 

A  classical  example  admirably  adapted  to  illustrate 
the  point  at  issue  is  the  life-history  of  the  famous 
leaf-roller  Rhynchites  betulse  L. ;  for  in  constructing 
the  cradle  for  its  young  this  tiny  black  snout-beetle 
has  for  ages  been  carrying  out  a  problem  which,  at 
least  in  its  entirety,  was  not  known  to  man  before  the 
year  1673,  when  the  great  mathematical  genius,  Huy- 
gens,  published  his  celebrated  "Horologium  Oscilla- 
torium. ' ' 

L,et  us  give  a  brief  account  of  the  famous  beetle 
and  its  problem,  basing  our  remarks  on  the  investiga- 
tions and  writings  of  Debay  l )  and  of  Wasmann  a ) 
and  upon  observations  made  by  ourselves  many  years 
ago  in  Holland. 

In  early  spring,  as  soon  as  the  Rh,  betula  3)  has 
emerged  from  the  ground,  it  climbs  up  a  birch-tree, 
where,  after  mating,  the  female  at  once  proceeds  to  con- 
struct from  the  pliant  young  birch  leaves  a  little  house 
for  her  offspring.  Carefully  examining  the  edge  of  a 
leaf,  the  beetle  suddenly  stops  and  begins  to  cut  the  out- 
lines of  what  is  to  be  the  cradle  for  its  little  ones.  It 
starts  at  the  upper  margin  of  one  side  of  the  leaf. 
Directing  its  head  toward  the  upper  part  of  the  central 
rib,  it  cuts  with  its  admirably  adapted  mandibles  an 
S-shaped  curve,  whose  terminal  touches  the  leaf's 

1 )  Dr.  Debay,  Beitraege  zur  Entwicklungsgeschichte  der 
Ruesselkaefer  aus  der  Familie  der  Attelabiden,  Bonn,  1846. 

J)  Erich  Wasmann,  S.  J.,  Der  Trichterwickler,  Muenster, 
1884.  The  following  account  was  first  published  in  the 
Scientific  American,  April,  1901. 

3)  From  betula,  birch-tree. 


INSTINCT  AND  FINAL  TENDENCY.  21 

central  rib.  Then,  after  having  made  a  slight  incision 
into  the  main  nerve  of  the  leaf,  in  order  to  impair  the 
flow  of  the  sap,  it  cuts  across  the  other  half  of  the 
leaf  a  corresponding  but  more  horizontal  curve  which 
terminates  a  little  higher  on  the  central  rib.  After 
repassing  the  line  of  the  entire  cut  to  trim  the 
edges  and  to  cut  through  some  nerves  still  connected, 
it  once  more  stations  itself  at  the  starting-point  of  the 
whole  operation.  With  the  claws  of  its  legs,  whose 
femurs  are  powerful  levers,  it  next  grasps  the  edge  of 
the  leaf,  and  walking  now  downward,  now  to  the 
middle,  it  rolls  up  in  less  than  two  minutes  one- 
half  of  the  leaf  into  a  sort  of  funnel,  opening  down- 
ward. After  a  short  repast,  which  very  prudently  is 
taken  from  parts  close  to  the  main  ribs,  our  little 
worker  hastens  to  roll  up  the  other  side  of  the  leaf 
around  the  funnel  just  formed,  in  which  operation  it 
uses  its  legs  in  a  manner  just  the  reverse  of  the  former. 

Now,  after  30  minutes'  work,  the  main  prepara- 
tions have  been  completed  for  depositing  the  eggs.  The 
beetle  crawls  into  the  funnel's  interior,  cuts  out  three 
or  four  little  pockets  and  introduces  an  egg  into  each. 
After  this  has  been  done,  nothing  remains  but  to  close 
the  precious  chamber  as  firmly  as  possible.  To  ac- 
complish this,  it  walks  first  to  the  upper  end  of  the 
funnel  and  pierces  the  different  layers  of  the  leaf  in 
such  a  way  as  to  make  them  adhere  to  each  other. 
Then  it  returns  to  the  lower  end  of  the  leaf,  and  grasp- 
ing its  apex,  forms  a  second  funnel,  with  its  opening 
directed  upward  and  fitting  exactly  into  the  larger  one 
(Plate  I.,  fig.  1). 

In  doing  all  this  our  little  architect,  otherwise  of  so 


22  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

timid  a  nature,  exhibits  such  an  interest  and  fervor 
that,  as  I  myself  more  than  once  have  observed,  it 
does  not  desist  from  its  ingenious  work  once  begun, 
even  though  taken  into  the  observer's  hand. 

Now  in  what  does  the  real  problem  of  the  beetle 
consist,  and  what  has  it  to  do  with  the  conservation  of 
its  species? 

Unrolling  the  leaf  and  spreading  it  on  a  plain  sur- 
face (Fig  2),  we  shall  find  that  the  exterior  margin 
of  the  leaf  and  the  S-curve  cut  by  the  beetle  are  in 
the  same  relation  to  each  other  as  the  two  curves  of 
higher  mathematics,  the  involute  and  evolute,  i.  e., 
v  w,  t  u,  r  s,  p  g,  I  m  are  almost  perpendicular  to 
the  exterior  margin  w  u  s  q  m,  and  are  equal  to 
the  corresponding  curves  v y  g,  t  y  g,  r y  g,  p y  g, 
lyg,  respectively.  In  other  words,  our  little  mathe- 
matician cuts  its  S-curve  so  that  the  length  of  the  cut 
made  and  the  distance  from  the  exterior  margin  always 
remain  the  same.  This  problem  coincides  with  the  task 
of  higher  mathematics,  from  a  given  involute  to  con- 
struct the  corresponding  evolute,  and  consequently  in- 
volves a  most  complicate  combination  of  differential 
calculus  and  geometry. 

But  to  what  kind  of  curve  does  the  evolute  of  Rh. 
betula  belong?  As  Prof.  Heis  first  discovered,  the 
evolute  in  this  case  is  nothing  else  than  an  unfinished 
circle,  which  has  its  terminals  in  the  joints  g  and 
y.  According  to  the  same  authority,  the  more 
horizontal  curve  of  the  second  half  of  the  leaf  is  to 
be  considered  as  a  very  appropiate  flattening  of  the 
first  curve,  which  has  a  more  perpendicular  position. 
For,  since  the  broader  exterior  windings  A,  B,  C> 


INSTINCT  AND  FINAL  TENDENCY. 

PLATE  No.  I. 


OO 
i<j 


Fig.  1.— The   Scientifically   Constructed  Nest 
of  the  Rhynchites  Betulae.    (After  Wasmann.) 


Fi?.  2.    (After  Wasmann  modified.)  Fig.  3.    (After  Wasmann.) 

The  curve  g  w'  u'  e'  q'  o'  in'  k'  h'  Vepr^ents  the  mathemalical  hivdute  belonging  10 
the  evolute  g  i  1  n  p  r  t  v  y. 


INSTINCT  AND  FINAL  TENDENCY.  25 

correspond  to  the  smaller  interior  //,  G,  F,  without 
being  shortened  (i.  e.  a  b  and  cd  are  equal  iolm  and 
z"  k  respectively) ,  the  second  S-curve  must  necessarily 
lie  in  a  more  horizontal  position. 

This  is  one  part  of  our  little  builder's  problem. 
The  other  consists  in  the  suitableness  of  the  chosen 
curve  to  the  formation  of  a  funnel.  Supposing  that 
the  beetle  wished  to  construct  from  the  birch  leaf  the 
largest  and  strongest  funnel  possible,  and  that,  too, 
in  the  shortest  time  and  with  the  expenditure  of  the 
least  amount  of  its  limited  strength,  it  could  really 
not  choose  a  more  suitable  curve. 

The  funnel  may  be  considered  as  a  surface  coiii- 
cally  evolvable  which,  when  spread  out  upon  a  plane, 
coincides  with  it  in  all  its  points.  Now  such  a  sur- 
face can  be  rolled  up  in  two  ways,  so  that  the  lines 
of  convolution  meet  either  in  one  point  or  in  a  row  of 
points,  lying  in  a  straight  or  curved  line  (Fig.  3). 
To  have  them  meet  in  one  point  is,  in  our  case,  alto- 
gether out  of  question.  For  apart  from  the  fact  that 
the  central  rib  would  most  probably  tear  in  the  course 
of  the  operation,  it  would  exceed  the  strength  of  our 
little  beetle  to  handle  the  whole  surface  o  a  at  once. 
Therefore,  the  second  manner  of  convolution  had  to  be 
chosen.  Yet  here  again  it  would  not  do  to  have  the 
upper  margin  in  a  straight  line,  for  in  rolling  up  the 
leaf,  the  upper  and  lower  openings  would  have  to  be- 
come either  equal  in  their  respective  diameters,  and 
we  would  have  no  funnel,  but  only  a  useless  cylinder; 
or  they  would  be  unequal,  the  larger  opening  being 
either  above  or  below.  If  above,  the  funnel,  be- 
cause reversed,  evidently  would  not  serve  its  purpose ; 


26  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

if  below,  the  length  of  the  side  o  a  would  either  not 
correspond  to  that  of  the  outer  edge  a  g  or  at  least 
the  oblique  position  of  the  funnel  would  make  it  im- 
possible to  wind  the  other  half  of  the  leaf  around  it. 
The  margin,  therefore,  must  be  a  curved  line.  But 
this  curved  line  again  would  be  either  convex  or  con- 
cave; or  partly  convex,  partly  concave.  Of  these  pos- 
sible cases,  the  first  two  would  be  impractical;  for  the 
merely  convex  margin  has  all  the  disadvantages  of  a 
straight  one,  and,  besides,  would  make  the  poor 
beetle  do  superfluous  work  in  rolling  up  a  part  of  the 
leaf  (0  b  a  c)  that  is  of  no  use  in  the  formation  of  the 
funnel.  A  funnel  with  a  merely  concave  margin 
would  have  too  many  windings  closely  packed  at  the 
top,  and  thus  overtax  the  strength  of  the  builder; 
and  the  funnel,  which  is  subsequently  to  serve  also 
as  food  for  the  larvae,  would  perhaps  have  dwindled 
down  too  much  in  size. 

There  remains  only  the  concavo-convex  line 
of  section,  in  which  again  either  the  convex  or 
the  concave  part  might  be  longer.  And  here,  as  Was- 
mann  justly  remarks,  "the  technical  ingenuity  of  our 
architect  shows  itself  in  its  brightest  light. ' '  For  what 
would  be  the  result  if  the  convex  part  were  longer? 
We  need  only  cut  such  a  funnel  from  paper  and  see. 
First  of  all,  it  is  not  pointed  enough.  Besides,  the 
part  h  b  is  not  in  the  spiral  of  the  point,  as  it  should 
be,  but  along  the  vertical  axis,  and  thereby  the  curve 
o  cb  d  will  no  longer  have  the  required  length.  And 
the  part  c  a  b  d  would  most  unsuitably  protrude  above 
the  funnel's  apex.  At  any  rate,  the  funnel  would  be 


INSTINCT  AND  FINAL  TENDENCY.  27 

lacking  in  firmness  and  could  not  be  closed  so  tightly 
as  it  should  be. 

But  if,  as  is  actually  the  fact,  our  architect  chooses 
to  make  the  concave  part  of  the  margin  longer  in  the 
above  mentioned  proportion  to  the  leaf's  outer  mar- 
gin, then  all  requirements  are  most  admirably  met, 
and  not  a  trace  of  the  disadvantages  of  the  former 
methods  can  be  discovered.  Without  wishing  to  main- 
tain that  no  other  curve  might  possibly  bring  about 
the  same  result,  there  is  certainly  none  so  simple  and 
yet  so  wonderfully  appropiate. 

To  understand  this  still  more  clearty,  we  may  finally 
direct  our  attention  for  a  moment  to  the  purpose 
which  the  funnel  has.  What  is  the  real  destiny  of  this 
artistic  house?  To  insure  the  preservation  of  the 
species  of  Rhynchites  betulce,  it  is  absolutely  necessary 
that  in  its  larval  stage  the  young  progeny  should  be 
guarded  against  all  harmful  influences  resulting  from 
atmospheric  changes.  Now  it  has  been  experimentally 
proved  that  every  larva,  in  spite  of  abundant  v  food, 
simply  dries  up  when  taken  out  of  the  tightly  rolled 
and  well-sealed  funnel.  Moreover,  on  account  of  the 
constitution  of  its  stomach ,  the  larva  can  feed  only  on 
dry  leaves,  supplied  by  its  habitation.  That  the  birch 
leaf  might  be  dry  in  due  time,  the  mother  beetle 
wisely  provided  by  making  the  incision  in  the 
leaf's  central  rib.  Finally,  because  the  number  of  its 
progeny  is  so  exceedingly  small,  it  had  to  guard  them 
well  against  all  insectivorous  animals.  But  who  can 
suggest  a  hiding-place  better  adapted  to  its  purposes 
than  a  dry,  meaningless  leaf,  rolled  up  and  closed  with 
so  great  care? 


28  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

A  great  many  other  examples  of  a  less  impressive 
but  similar  nature  could  be  enumerated,  all 
evincing  the  self  same  conclusion  that  the  instinct- 
ive actions  of  animals  are  of  themselves  highly  appro- 
piate  to  their  purpose  and  reveal  a  true  final  tendency. 

Or,  for  what  other  reason  but  to  seek  protection 
from  danger  do  worms  contract  the  segments  of  their 
body,  hedgehogs  roll  themselves  into  balls  bristling 
with  spikes,  snails  retire  into  their  shells,  turtles  with- 
draw their  heads  and  legs  and  hide  themselves  in  the 
sand,  young  snakes  jump  into  the  mouth  of  their  par- 
ent, chickens  seek  protection  under  the  wings  of  the 
hen? 

Nor  can  any  other  explanation  than  "purpose"  be 
given  for  those  actions  by  which  animals  preserve 
their  species.  Or,  why  do  they  always  deposit  their 
eggs  in  places  which  offer  the  most  suitable  food  for 
their  offspring?  Why  do  mosquitoes  drop  their  eggs 
into  water,  the  only  place  where  the  young  can  devel- 
op, cabbage-butterflies  deposit  them  on  the  under  side 
of  the  cabbage  leaf,  Sitaris  in  the  nest-entrance  of  An- 
tophoras?  Why  does  the  fly  Gastrus  equi  paste  them 
on  the  breast  of  a  horse,  where  they  are  licked  up  t»y 
the  horse's  tongue  and  forwarded  into  its  stomach, 
the  only  place  where  the  maggots  find  their  specific  and 
necessary  nourishment?  Why  do  several  species  of 
solitary  wasps  fasten  their  eggs  on  the  bodies  of  living 
but  paralyzed  spiders,  caterpillars  and  grasshoppers? 

Why  does  the  great  water-scavenger,  Hydrophilus 
piceus  build  a  little  boat  for  its  eggs,  and  Lomechusa, 
Xenodusa,  Atemeles  .  .  .  bring  them  into  the 
nests  of  ants;  why  in  short  does  every  species  find 


INSTINCT  AND  FINAL  TENDENCY.  29 

those  places  and  conditions,  which  are  best  adapted 
to  secure  the  welfare  of  its  offspring?  There  can  be 
no  question  of  chance  where  such  a  universal  exper- 
ience confronts  us  with  such  wonderful  facts,  and  it  is 
consequently  evident  that  a  "purpose"  in  finding 
suitable  nourishment,  in  protecting  the  individual 
and  propagating  the  species  is  an  essential  constituent 
of  all  instinctive  actions  of  animals. 


CHAPTER  III. 
Instinct  and  Consciousness  of  Finality. 

I  NSTINCTI VE  actions  are  essentially  of  a  purposeful 
and  seemingly  intelligent  character  being  directed, 
as  we  have  shown,  toward  the  welfare  of  individual 
and  species.  We  must  now  examine  what  relation 
instinctive  actions  have  to  the  agent's  cognition  and 
appetency?  For  the  answer  to  this  question  will  de- 
termine the  specific  character  of  instinctive  actions  in 
contradistinction  to  all  other  kinds  of  actions  performed 
by  man  or  animal.  Hence  we  ask  whether  we  are 
justified  to  infer  that  the  final  tendency  which  is  evi- 
dently manifested  in  the  case  of  the  instincts  is  as  such 
or  in  itself  an  object  of  cognition  and  volition  on  the 
part  of  the  agent.  Some  believe  that  it  is  impossible  to 
answer  this  question  in  a  satisfactory  manner.  Ladd 
says  of  instinctive  actions  that  "they  seem  like  the 
deeds  of  intelligent  will  striving  to  realize  ideas  held 
up  by  imagination  and  thought."  But,  "how  far  an 
actual  examination  of  the  data  of  consciousness  justi- 
fies the  seeming,  is  a  question  which  can  probably 
never  be  answered  satisfactorily. "  l ) 

')  George    Trumbul    Ladd,    Psychology,    descriptive  and 
explanatory,  4.  ed.,  New  York,  1903,  p.  598. 

(30) 


INSTINCT  AND  CONSCIOUSNESS  OF  FINALITY.        31 

We  believe  that  this  is  not  so.  It  is  certainly  im- 
possible to  determine  in  detail  how  the  single  instinc- 
tive actions  are  performed  and  how  they  originated. 
But  the  simple  fact  whether  or  not  they  proceed  from 
an  intellectual  or  a  merely  sensuous  principle  or  from 
no  principle  of  cognition  at  all  can,  we  believe,  be 
easily  ascertained.  I^et  us  see. 

Our  first  proposition  is  that,  as  in  the  instincts  of 
man  so  also  in  the  instincts  of  animals,  the  connection 
of  the  action  and  its  final  purpose  is  entirely  uncon- 
scious; or  as  James  says:  "Instinct  is  usually  defined 
as  the  faculty  of  acting  in  such  a  way  as  to  produce 
certain  ends,  without  foresight  of  the  ends,  and  with- 
out previous  education  in  the  performance. "  2) 

We  are  led  to  this  conclusion  first  of  all  by  the 
perfect  analogy  that  exists  between  the  instinctive  ac- 
tions of  animals  and  of  man  himself.  For  there  are 
many  actions  of  man  of  an  instinctive  nature  and  per- 
fectly similar  to  the  corresponding  acts  of  animals. 
Consequently,  if  the  instinctive  actions  of  man  are  un- 
conscious, the  same  must  be  asserted  of  the  instinctive 
actions  of  animals.  The  hungry  babe  endeavors  to 
suck,  or  gives  expression  to  its  feelings  by  crying,  un- 
til its  mother  has  appeased  its  craving.  It  is  evident 
that  these  actions  are  appropriate  to  the  purpose;  nor 
is  it  less  evident  that  they  are  the  result  of  instinct  and 
not  of  reason.  But  how?  Is  the  babe  conscious  of  the 
final  tendency  of  its  actions?  Does  it  cry  because  it 
knows  that  crying  is  a  means  to  induce  its  mother, 

2)  W.James,  The  Principles  of  Psychology,  vol.  II.  1904, 
p.  383.  James'  definition  is  incomplete,  as  we  shall  point 
out  below. 


32  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

to  satisfy  its  hunger?  Evidently  not.  For  our  own 
experience  proves  that  as  children  we  were  not  con- 
scious of  the  suitability  of  such  acts.  Moreover,  the 
supposition  of  consciousness  on  the  part  of  the  child 
involves  a  contradiction.  Its  knowledge  of  the 
appropriateness  of  the  action  would  have  to  be  derived 
from  nature  or  from  experience  or  from  personal  re- 
flection. The  first  assumption  is  inadmissible;  for 
there  are  no  innate  ideas.  Nor  can  there  be  a  question 
of  experience;  for  the  new-born  babe  cries  previously 
to  all  experience  of  the  result  of  its  wailing.  Nor  can 
we  fall  back  upon  reflection;  for  the  child  is  incapable 
of  using  its  mental  faculties.  Therefore,  the  cry  of 
hunger  is  entirely  unconscious.  The  same  must  be 
said  of  all  our  instinctive  actions  even  of  those  which 
are  performed  after  we  have  attained  the  use  of  reason. 
Our  consciousness  offers  unmistakable  testimony 
that  we  do  not  reflect  in  extending  our  hands  or  closing 
our  eyes  on  the  sudden  and  unexpected  approach  of  a 
dangerous  object.  This  fact  leads  to  the  inference 
that  animals,  likewise,  have  not  the  remotest  idea  of 
the  appropriateness  of  their  instinctive  activity. 

But  here  we  are  confronted  by  some  who  reject  this 
conclusion  from  analogy  and  entirely  disregard  the 
fact,  that  it  is  the  only  way  of  gaining  insight  into  the 
functions  of  the  animal  soul. 

It  is  under  the  influence  of  this  opinion  that  Pro- 
fessor Ziegler  writes  in  his  treatise  on  the  nature  of 
instinct:  "We  must  leave  aside  the  notion  of  con- 
sciousness, if  we  wish  to  acquire  a  useful  concept  of 
instinct. ' '  For,  '  'who  can  tell  whether  a  dog,  a  lizard, 
a  fish,  a  beetle,  a  snail,  a  worm  act  consciously  or  un- 


INSTINCT  AND  CONSCIOUSNESS  OF  FINALITY.        33 

consciously?  In  the  natural  sciences  it  is  a  very  doubtful 
proceeding  to  admit  into  a  definition  any  mark  which 
cannot  be  judged  upon  empirically." 

On  the  contrary,  we  must  insist  on  a  principle  well 
explained  by  Romanes  in  his  "Animal  Intelligence." 
"Taking  it  for  granted,"  he  says,  "that  the  external 
indications  of  mental  processes  which  we  observe  in 
animals  are  trustworthy,  so  that  we  are  justified  in  in- 
ferring particular  mental  states  from  particular  bodily 
actions,  it  follows  that  in  consistency  we  must  every- 
where apply  the  same  criteria.  .  .  .  It  is,  of  course,  per- 
fectly true  that  the  less  the  resemblance,  the  less  is  the 
value  of  any  analogy  built  upon  the  resemblance,  and 
therefore  that  the  inference  of  an  ant  or  a  bee  feeling 
sympathy  or  rage  is  not  so  valid  as  is  the  similar  in- 
ference in  the  case  of  a  dog  or  a  monkey.  Still  it  is 
an  inference,  and,  so  far  as  it  goes,  a  valid  one — being, 
in  fact,  the  only  inference  available.  That  is  to  say, 
if  we  observe  an  ant  or  a  bee  apparently  exhibiting 
sympathy  or  rage,  we  must  either  conclude  that  some 
psychological  state  resembling  that  of  sympathy  or 
rage  is  present,  or  else  refuse  to  think  about  the  sub- 
ject at  all;  from  the  observable  facts  there  is  no  other 
inference  open. ' '  Romanes  adds  that  the  analogy  from 
human  to  brute  psychology  becomes  weaker  and  weak- 
er as  we  recede  through  the  animal  kingdom  down- 
wards from  man;  but  he  insists  that  "it  is  the  only 
analogy  available"  and  "that  when  we  get  down  as 
low  as  the  insects  I  think  the  most  we  can  confidently 
assert  is  that  the  known  facts  of  human  psychology 
furnish  the  best  available  pattern  of  the  probable  facts 
of  insect  psychology. "  * ) 

')  P.  8. 


34  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

Romanes  is  correct  in  insisting  upon  this  analogy. 
For  from  like  effects  we  may  and  must  conclude  to  like 
causes,  and  consequently  it  is  sound  logic  to  maintain 
that,  if  two  actions  have  the  same  manifestation  in  man 
and  animal,  they  must  be  similar  in  their  nature.  He 
who  denies  this  principle  can  make  no  statement  on 
animal  instinct,  since  by  internal  experience  he  is  ac- 
quainted only  with  his  own  instinctive  actions,  whilst 
he  has  no  knowledge  whatever  of  their  nature  in  other 
men,  much  less  in  animals. 

But  we  may  go  still  further  than  Romanes.  We 
need  not  compare  the  instinctive  actions  of  man  and 
animal  in  every  respect,  but  may  restrict  our  present 
consideration  for  instance  to  the  manifestation  of  con- 
sciousness of  finality.  Now  human  psychology  fur- 
nishes us  with  a  number  of  data  taken  from  circum- 
stances which  clearly  demonstrate  that  the  actions  in 
question  cannot  possibly  involve  any  cognition  of  final 
tendency  as  such.  Hence,  if  we  can  show  the  pres- 
ence of  the  same  identical  data  in  the  instinctive  ac- 
tions of  animals,  we  have  a  perfect  analogy  and  hence 
a  reliable  conclusion. 

Our  first  argument  in  support  of  this  statement  is 
taken  from  the  very  performance  of  instinctive  actions 
on  the  parts  of  animals. 

Let  us  return  to  the  illustration  taken  from  the 
larva  of  Sitaris  humeralis.  Whence  does  it  know 
that  in  its  first  larval  stage  it  can  live  only  on  the  egg  of 
a  bee?  Whence  is  it  aware  that  it  may  indeed  start  out 
on  its  trip  on  the  back  of  the  male,  but  must  in  the 
course  of  it  pass  over  to  the  female  bee  and  finally 
glide  down  upon  the  egg?  Whence  does  it  know  that 


INSTINCT  AND  CONSCIOUSNESS  OF  FINALITY.        35 

in  its  second  stage  honey  and  only  honey  is  to  be  taken 
as  nourishment,  though  precisely  this  same  honey 
would  have  caused  its  death  in  the  first  stage?  Does 
it  know  it  perhaps  from  experience?  But  only  once 
in  its  life  does  our  larva  undertake  this  journey 
through  the  air,  only  once  does  it  feed  on  the  bee's 
egg,  only  once  on  the  honey  of  the  cell.  Moreover 
any  attempt  at  experiments  would  have  resulted  in 
death.  Therefore,  Sitaris  does  not  know  from  its  own 
experience,  how  and  where  it  has  to  provide  for  its 
development.  Nor  is  it  less  ridiculous  to  assume  that 
a  very  good  memory  aided  our  larva  in  finding  its 
proper  food.  That  would  indeed  be  a  unique  memory 
which  remembers  facts  that  have  never  been  exper- 
ienced. But  somebody  else,  perhaps  a  careful  mother, 
might  have  given  her  darling  definite  instructions  as 
to  the  future  before  it  departed  from  home.  Indeed,  an 
idyllic  idea!  It  is  too  bad  that  professor  Sitaris  had  to 
die  before  even  one  of  her  disciples  could  leave  the  egg. 
Therefore,  we  must  either  suspect  with  the  elder  Ag- 
assiz  that  instinct  is  a  faculty  of  a  much  higher  kind 
that  the  intellect  of  man,  or  take  refuge  in  the  ridicu- 
lous caricatures  of  Brehm's  intelligent  dolls,  which  pre- 
vious to  any  experience  excogitate  by  aprioristic  reason- 
ing the  actions  most  appropiate  for  their  future  life. 
But  as  these  suppositions  are  evidently  absurd,  we  must 
necessarily  assume  that  Sitaris  performs  these  instinct- 
ive actions  without  any  knowledge  or  consciousness 
of  their  purpose;  for  a  purpose  which  cannot  be  appre- 
hended is  not  apprehended  de  facto.  The  same  con- 
clusion is  forced  upon  us  by  the  action  of  the  Rhyn- 
chites  betulae  in  cutting  a  curve  into  the  leaf  of  a 


36  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTK. 

birch-tree,  whose  construction,  if  performed  by  man, 
implies  the  application  of  geometry  and  calculus. 
The  same  explanation  is  demanded  by  the  action  ot 
the  male-larva  of  the  stag-beetle  (Lucanus  elaphas), 
which  spins  a  cocoon  for  its  future  antlers  twice  as 
large  as  does  the  female  larva;  the  same  of  the  so- 
called  silk-worms  which  when  constructing  their 
double-walled  cocoon  for  the  winter  season  leave  a 
true  but  well  closed  door  for  escape  in  early  spring. 
(Plate  II.  Fig.  1.) 

Nor  can  any  other  reasonable  interpretation  be 
given  of  the  actions  of  birds  which  after  their  very 
first  mating  begin  to  gather  blades  of  grass  and  like 
material  for  their  future  nest,  deposit  their  eggs  in  it 
and  hatch  out  their  offspring.  Nor  does  the  apparent 
sagacity  of  domestic  animals  in  distinguishing  so  well 
and  at  once  between  hundreds  of  poisonous  and  nutri- 
tious herbs  warrant  any  other  conclusion.  In  fine,  all 
instinctive  actions  of  animals  at  least  at  their  first  oc- 
currence and  previous  to  experience  cannot  be  ex- 
plained otherwise  than  by  the  conclusion  that  under 
the  mere  impulse  of  instinct  animals  are  entirely  un- 
conscious of  the  final  tendency,  so  brilliantly  mani- 
fested in  their  highly  appropriate  activity. 

A  second  proof  that  animals  cannot  know  the  pur- 
pose of  their  instinctive  actions  has  often  been  derived 
from  their  peculiar  and  constant  regularity.  "A  still 
more  important  reason,"  says  Wundt,  "which  op- 
poses the  derivation  of  merely  instinctive  actions  from 
conscious  reasoning,  may  be  found  in  the  fact  that 
they  are  repeated  by  all  individuals  of  the  same  spec- 
ies with  great  regularity,  though  there  is  no  possibility 


INSTINCT  AND  CONSCIOUSNESS  OF  FINAIJTY.        3T 

PLATE  II. 


Fig.  1.    The  silk-worm  Attacus  Cecropia  and  Its  cocoon.     (Original.) 


Fig  2.    A  Solitary  Wasp  "using  stone  to  pound  down  earth  over  nest." 

(Peckham.) 


INSTINCT  AND  CONSCIOUSNESS  OF  FINALITY.        39 

of  proving  that  between  the  single  individuals  there 
exists  any  connection  which  might  explain  the  per- 
fect agreement  in  their  behavior. ' '  And  the  zoologist 
Schneider  adds  in  still  clearer  terms,  "that  in  the 
habits  of  insects  a  regularity  and  predetermination 
should  be  observed  which  cannot  be  detected  in  the 
conscious  actions  of  man.  In  opposition  to  merely 
instinctive  habits  precisely  those  associations  which 
are  formed  by  ratiocination  are  characterized  by  a  con- 
stant variation,  whilst  the  instincts  of  the  individuals 
of  the  same  species  remain  constant. "  1 ) 

Here  is  an  illustration  of  this  well  known  fact, 
mentioned  by  Peckham.  The  solitary  wasp  Sphex- 
ichneumonea  leaves  her  grass-hopper  (which  is  to 
serve  as  food  for  the  young)  just  at  the  entrance  to 
the  excavation  (of  her  nest)  and  first  enters  to  see 
that  all  is  right  within.  In  experimenting  with  a 
French  Sphex,  which  has  the  same  habit,  Fabre  (the 
famous  French  naturalist  mentioned  above)  moved 
the  creature  a  little  way  off;  the  wasp  came  out, 
brought  it  to  the  opening  as  before,  and  went  in  a 
second  time.  This  was  repeated  again  and  again  un- 
til the  patience  of  the  naturalist  was  exhausted,  and 
the  persistent  wasp  took  her  booty  in  after  her  appro- 
piate  fashion.  She  must  place  the  grass-hopper  just 
so  close  to  the  doorway,  she  must  then  descend  and 
examine  the  nest  and  after  that  must  come  out  and 
drag  it  down.  Nothing  less  than  the  performance 
of  these  acts  in  a  certain  order  satisfies  her  impulse. 

')  Cf.  T.  Pesch.S.  J.,  Die  grossen  Weltraetsel,  1883,  vol. 
I.,  p.  426. 


40  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

There  must  be  no  disturbance  of  the   regular  method 
or  she  refuses  to  proceed.    1 ) 

This  argument  is  rendered  still  more  efficacious, 
if  we  consider  how  often  this  very  regularity  of  the 
action  destroys  its  appropriate  character,  although  in 
common  circumstances  every  instinctive  action  is 
adapted  to  its  purpose.  It  may  happen  that  these  cir- 
cumstances are  disturbed  by  man  or  some  other  cause. 
Now  if  the  animal  were  conscious  of  its  instinctive 
actions,  it  evidently  would  either  desist  from  acting  or 
adapt  its  action  to  the  changed  conditions.  But  as 
many  facts  have  proved,  animals  prefer  to  exhibit  the 
most  stupid  performances  rather  than  change  their 
usual  course  of  procedure.  A  goose  deprived  of  its 
embryo  goslings  continues  with  great  zest  to  hatch  on 
the  dunghill,  and  hens  will  do  the  same  on  pseudo-eggs 
and  iron  chains.  Birds,  that  have  seen  their  offspring 
killed  before  their  eyes,  continue  to  gather  food  for 
their  fledglings.  Altum  vouches  for  the  fact,  that 
some  northern  birds  when  deprived  of  their  eggs  go  so 
far  in  phenomenal  stupidity  as  to  collect  food  and  dis- 
gorge it  in  the  nest  when  the  time  has  arrived  for  the 
appearance  of  their  brood,  as  if  it  were  actually  present; 
or  they  offer  food  to  the  eggs  which  have  become  add- 
led by  excessive  hatching.  2  )  Chickens  have  the  in- 
stinct of  scratching  which  ordinarily  serves  to  expose 
their  food  or  prepare  their  nest.  But  they  also  scratch 
on  a  stone  floor  or  on  the  top  of  a  heap  of  grain,  and  do 
not  pickup  a  single  morsel  without  dashing  a  dozen  or 
more  against  the  opposite  wall.  Insects  which  in  case  of 

1)  I.e.,  p.  212. 

2)  Dr.  B.  Altum,  Der  Vogel  und  sein  L,eben,  6.  ed.,  p.  200. 


INSTINCT  AND  CONSCIOUSNESS  OF  FINALITY.         41 

danger  simulate  death  and  drop  on  the  ground  do  ex- 
actly the  same  if  instead  of  firm  ground  there  is  a  pool 
of  water  below  them.  Even  ants,  in  spite  of  their  high- 
ly developed  faculty  of  adaptation,  do  not  act  less 
stupidly.  Generally  speaking  they  adopt  in  observa- 
tion nests  the  same  line  of  instinctive  actions  which 
were  useful  to  them  in  their  natural  state,  although  in 
the  changed  conditions  those  actions  are  often  useless 
and  even  harmful. 

Instances  such  as  these  could  be  multiplied  indefi- 
nitely. At  present  let  us  add  but  two  striking  illus- 
trations which  Peckham  enumerates  as  "errors  of  in- 
stinct. ' '  Cerceris  ornata  is  the  name  of  a  solitary  wasp, 
which  is  known  to  kill  certain  bees  of  the  genus  Haly- 
ctus  by  means  of  its  sting,  to  carry  them  into  its  nest 
of  sand  and  place  an  egg  upon  the  ventral  side  of 
the  bee.  One  day  "while  Cerceris  was  away  hunting, 
some  dry  sand  was  thrown  into  the  nest,  and  the  en- 
trance was  then  stopped  with  damp  sand.  She  returned 
laden  with  prey,  and  seeing  herself  forced  to  resume 
the  profession  of  a  miner,  abandoned  her  victim,  cleared 
the  entrance,  penetrated  within,  came  out  again  and 
flew  off  in  search  of  new  prey.  After  two  successive 
trips  she  penetrated  a  third  time  into  her  dwelling  and 
began  to  reject  the  dry  sand  which  had  been  thrown  in. 
In  the  midst  of  this  sand  was  a  bee  (which  she  had  drop- 
ped before).  Presently  the  wasp  flew  away.  The  hours 
passed  on  and  she  returned  without  a  bee,  entered  and 
threw  out  the  other  one  which  she  now  considered  an 
encumbering  object.  Thus  of  two  victims  which  were 
procured  with  great  trouble,  one  was  abandoned  on 
the  thresh-hold,  and  the  other  was  dropped  halfway 


42  THE  HUMANIZING  OP  THE  BRUTE. 

in — neither  served  as  food  for  larvae.  What  of  that? 
Cerceris  had  given  the  sting — that  was  enough.  At 
another  time  a  nest,  one  of  the  cells  of  which  was  not 
entirely  provisioned,  was  destroyed  at  evening.  On 
the  next  morning  Cerceris  brought  a  newly  stung  bee 
and  placed  it  in  the  hole.  On  the  following  day  she 
came  agaia  charged  with  prey  and  dropped  her  bee 
which  rolled  to  the  bottom  of  the  excavation.  She  had 
not  brought  the  full  number  for  provisioning  the  nest. 
Instinct  commanded  her  to  bring  them,  and  she  obey- 
ed but  not  knowing  where  to  put  them,  let  them  fall. " l ) 

From  such  instances  we  must  conclude  that  instinc- 
tive actions  as  such  are  never  connected  with  con- 
sciousness of  final  tendency.  For  these  cases  of  in- 
appropriateness  do  not  occur  only  now  and  then,  but 
may  be  occasioned  in  any  kind  of  instinctive  actions. 
They  cannot  be  the  result  of  a  misleading  reflection 
or  of  an  erroneous  judgment  influenced  by  will  power, 
or  by  the  appearance  of  truth;  for  of  this  there  can  be 
no  question  in  actions  so  stupid,  useless,  and  often  in- 
jurious. 

')  I.e.,  p.  219-220. 


CHAPTER  IV. 
Instinct  and  Sensuous   Cognition. 

IN  the  preceding  chapter  we  have  proved  that,  in 
spite  of  their  eminent  appropriate  ness,  the  instinct- 
ive actions  of  animals  do  not  betray  the  slightest  trace 
of  consciousness  of  finality.  But  we  are  not  allowed 
to  infer  that  all  unconscious  actions  which  manifest  a 
final  purpose  have  to  be  classified  as  instinctive.  If  this 
conclusion  were  legitimate,  many  vegetative  processes 
and  vital  actions  which  are  merely  automatic  would 
have  to  be  referred  to  the  domain  of  instinct.  In 
fact,  some  scientists  admit  a  so-called  organic  instinct. 
But  at  the  very  first  glance  it  is  evident  that  the  term 
is  not  used  in  its  proper  meaning.  Or  is  the  action  of 
plants  instinctive,  when  they  take  in  sap  by  their  roots 
or  carbon-dioxide  by  their  leaves?  This  would  be  as 
incorrect  as  to  maintain  that  the  beat  of  the  heart  and 
the  respiration  of  the  lungs  are  guided  by  instinct. 
For,  neither  vegetative  processes  nor  reflexive  activit- 
ies can  be  termed  instinctive  actions,  but  only  such  as 
are  connected  with  sensuous  cognition  and  appetency. 
Now,  first  of  all,  there  can  be  no  doubt  of  the  fact  that 
instinctive  actions  are  at  least  in  some  way  determined 
by  sensitive  cognition.  For  as  experience  shows,  ani- 
mals distinguish  very  well  in  their  instinctive  actions 
between  the  different  objects  that  surround  them  and 
administer  to  their  wants.  Birds  never  take  the  insects 
which  supply  their  food  for  the  material  out  of  which 

(43) 


44  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

they  build  their  nests.  Who  ever  saw  a  swallow  con- 
structing its  nest  of  flies  or  mosquitoes  and  feeding  its 
young  with  mud?  What  else,  than  some  kind  of 
sensuous  cognition  guides  the  hawk  when  it  swoops 
down  from  on  high  and  grasps  its  prey  with  unfailing 
certainty?  What  else  always  impels  the  hen  to  gather 
its  chicks  under  its  protecting  wing  on  the  first  ap- 
proach of  such  a  dangerous  visitor?  Indeed,  Descartes, 
misled  by  the  regularity  of  instinctive  actions,  spoke 
of  animals  as  of  automatic  beings  and  thought  that  he 
could  explain  animal  activity  by  his  '  'spiritus  vitales, ' ' 
certain  liquids  of  a  merely  mechanical  nature.  But  in 
doing  so  he  disregarded  the  fact  that  animals  have  real 
organs  that  produce  effects  similar  to  those  which  are 
brought  forth  by  the  sensitive  cognition  of  man  and  he 
forgot  how  variable  within  the  limits  of  a  certain  reg- 
ularity instinctive  actions  may  be.  Therefore,  the  fact 
that  some  kind  of  sensitive  cognition  determines  the 
animal,  when  acting  instinctively,  is  beyond  all  doubt. 
Nevertheless,  there  are  some  modern  scientists  of 
no  small  reputation  who  follow  the  example  of  Des- 
cartes and  maintain  that  instinctive  actions  are  in  no 
wise  influenced  by  sensitive  cognition,  but  are  of  a 
merely  mechanical  nature.  One  of  these  scientists  is 
Prof.  Jacques  L,oeb  *)  of  the  University  of  California, 
well  known  on  account  of  his  experiments  regarding 
artificial  parthenogenesis.  2)  L,oeb  boldly  asserts: 

1)  Studies   in  General  Physiology,  Chicago,  1905,  vol.  I. 
pp.  1—114. 

2)  We  may  note  here  that  these  experiments  have  nothing 
to  do  with  the  great  question  of  primo-genesis.     For,  all  ex- 
periments of  I/oeb  suppose  life,  and  there  is  none  among  them 


INSTINCT  AND  SENSUOUS  COGNITION.  45 

"What  has  been  taken  for  the  effect  of  'will'  or  'in- 
stinct' is  in  reality  the  effect  of  light,  of  gravity,  of  fric- 
tion, of  chemical  forces,  etc."  And  so  he  speaks  of 
heliotropism,  when  the  direction  of  the  rays  of  light 
determines  the  direction  of  the  movements  of  an  ani- 
mal or  its  orientation;  of  geotropism,  when  gravity,  or 
of  stereotropism,  when  contact  with  solid  bodies  deter- 
mines the  orientation,  and  so  forth. 

Heliotropism,  geotropisni,  and  stereotropism  may 
be  positive  or  negative.  They  are  positive,  if  the  ani- 
mal's motion  is  towards  the  light,  the  earth,  or  a  solid; 
negative,  if  in  the  opposite  direction.  In  further  de- 
scription of  his  purely  mechanical  theory,  Prof.  I^oeb 
uses  the  following  altogether  "unequivocal"  phrases: 
"By  the  help  of  light  the  botanist  controls  the  orienta- 
tion of  a  plant  at  will.  Why  should  he  maintain  that  the 
'will'  or  'instinct'  of  a  plant  [ !  ]  cooperates  with  the  rays 
of  light  when  the  orientation  is  determined  solely  and 
unequivocally  by  the  latter?  The  movements  of  an  ani- 
mal toward  the  light  are,  however,  ....  identical 
point  for  point  with  the  movement  of  a  plant  toward 
the  light.  Wherever  the  orientation  of  plants  has  been 
satisfactorily  controlled  experimentally,  light  has  in- 
deed been  considered  the  sole  determining  factor;  but 
in  the  case  of  animals,  in  which  in  similar  experiments 
light  is  without  doubt  also  the  sole  determining  factor, 
'instinct'  and  'freewill'  [sic!]  have  still  been  considered 
to  play  a  role. ' ' 

that  could  be  interpreted  as  having  any  connection  whatever 
with  spontaneous  generation.  Cf.  our  paper  on  "Modern 
Science  and  the  Origin  of  Life"in  the  New  York  Messenger, 
April,  1906. 


46  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

Loeb  grants  that  life-phenomena  are ' '  not  dependent 
solely  upon  the  external  causes  acting  upon  the  organ- 
ism at  a  given  moment,  but  upon  these  and  upon  the 
conditions  present  within  the  organism  taken  together; 
and  the  latter  conditions  are  in  themselves  variable." 

But  this  does  not  affect  in  any  way  the  mechanical 
character  of  his  theory.  The  manifestation  of  helio- 
tropism  changes,  but  it  remains  pure  and  unequivocal 
heliotropism.  Thus  "a  large  number  of  animals  be- 
come positively  heliotropic,  when  they  are  left  in  the 
dark  for  a  long  time.  If  they  are  brought  into  light 
of  sufficient  intensity,  they  become  negatively  helio- 
tropic after  a  time  and  this  the  more  quickly  the  more 
intense  the  light."  "We  do  not  therefore  always 
meet  with  simple  conditions  in  analyzing  the  causes 
which  determine  the  voluntary  movements  of  an  ani- 
mal; but  however  complicated  they  may  be,  the  vol- 
untary movements  of  animals  are  nevertheless,  as  our 
experience  indicates,  always  unequivocally  determined 
only  by  such  circumstances  as  determine  also  the 
movements  of  bodies  of  inanimate  nature. ' ' 

On  what  facts  does  L,oeb  base  his  theory?  L,et  us 
give  at  least  one  characteristic  example. 

The  caterpillars  of  Porthesia  chrysorrhoea  pass  the 
winter  in  their  nests  in  fruit  trees  and  bushes,  which 
they  leave  as  soon  as  it  becomes  warm.  Then  they 
creep  up  to  the  tips  of  branches  to  the  small  buds 
which  serve  as  their  food.  Now,  as  Loeb  expressly 
states,  it  is  merely  positive  heliotropism  and  negative 
geotropism  which  compels  the  caterpillars  to  creep 
upward,  where  they  are  held  fast  on  the  small  buds 
by  contact-irritability.  For  you  can  make  the  cater- 


INSTINCT  AND  SENSUOUS  COGNITION.  47 

pillars  starve  by  trie  aid  of  light  in  close  proximity  of 
food.  "The  animals  move  to  the  window-side  or  to 
the  top  of  a  test-tube  in  which  they  are  kept.  If, 
then,  a  branch,  covered  with  buds,  is  pushed  into  the 
test-tube  on  the  room  side,  the  animals  nevertheless 
remain  where  light  and  gravity  have  compelled  them 
to  go  and  are  holding  them.  If,  however,  they  once 
are  on  the  buds,  the  latter  act  as  a  stimulus  which 
may  be  even  stronger  than  light.  It  is  in  such  a  case 
impossible  to  draw  the  animals  away  from  the  food  by 
means  of  light. ' '  Besides  these  animals  retain  their 
positive  heliotropism  only  as  long  as  they  have  not 
yet  eaten  anything.  '  'As  soon  as  they  have  eaten  and 
are  about  to  moult,  their  irritability  decreases  and  at 
the  time  of  moulting  it  is  almost  impossible  to  show 
any  effect  of  light  or  gravity  upon  them. ' ' 

We  believe  that  Prof.  Loeb's  explanation  contains 
his  refutation.  For,  if  his  theory  were  correct,  all 
caterpillars  would  be  doomed  in  consequence  of  posit- 
ive heliotropism.  Caterpillars  usually  commence  eat- 
ing the  buds  of  the  highest  twigs,  and  having  devoured 
all  in  their  reach  above  them,  they  rest  for  some  time, 
until  all  is  more  or  less  digested.  Now  in  order  to 
get  new  food,  they  must  necessarily  creep  down  to 
another  twig  or  tree.  But  this  is  impossible.  For, 
their  "stomachs"  being  empty,  the  caterpillars  are 
positively  heliotropic,  and  consequently  they  will  all 
die  on  the  spot.  This,  however,  is  directly  opposed 
to  the  facts.  There  are  no  caterpillars  in  nature  that 
die  in  consequence  of  heliotropism  or  geotropism. 
As  long  as  they  are  hungry,  they  creep  from  one 
branch  to  another  and  in  all  possible  directions,  until 


48  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

they  find  the  desired  food.  That  they  did  not  do  so 
in  case  of  L,oeb's  test-tubes  is  merely  due  to  the  fact 
that  they  were  not  aware  of  the  food,  since  this  was 
at  an  altogether  unusual  and  dark  place.  Hunger, 
and  nothing  else  than  hunger,  is  the  cause  which  im- 
pels the  animal  to  follow  the  guidance  of  its  senses  in 
order  to  appease  that  craving.  This  is  the  sole  rea- 
son why,  as  soon  as  the  caterpillars  have  eaten,  and 
at  the  time  of  moulting,  "it  is  almost  impossible  to 
show  any  effect  of  light  or  gravity  upon  them. ' '  It 
is  not  heliotropism,  but  hungertropism,  or,  to  speak 
still  more  scientifically  limotropism,  that  accounts  for 
the  caterpillars  creeping  upward. 

Prof.  I,oeb  takes  the  liberty  of  sneering  at  the  use  of 
words  like  "instinct"  to  designate  causes  of  move- 
ment, and  says  that  such  causes  stand  upon  the  same 
plane  "as  the  supernatural  powers  of  theologians, 
which  are  also  said  to  determine  motions,  but  upon 
which  an  engineer  could  not  well  rely. "  He  more- 
over declares  the  method  of  Scholastic  thinking  a 
"handicap"  which,  by  phrases  like  "instinct"  serves 
to  ignore  or  conceal  the  true  problem  involved. 

Prof.  Loeb  forgets  that  there  are  two  kinds  of  prob- 
lems to  be  solved:  the  one  referring  to  the  more  re- 
mote and  ultimate  causes  of  phenomena;  the  other 
pertaining  to  their  proximate  causes  and  relations. 
Both  are  objects  worthy  of  the  intellect  of  man,  and 
neither  is  opposed  to  the  other.  But  while  the  second 
is  of  interest  to  the  specialist  only,  and  has  no  bearing 
on  the  great  questions  of  human  life,  the  other  is  of 
interest  to  every  man  who  is  anxious  to  study  the 
foundations  upon  which  his  relations  to  his  fellow- 


INSTINCT  AND  SENSUOUS  COGNITION.  49 

creatures  are  based  and  on  which  his  final  des- 
tinies depend.  Indeed,  if  Prof.  Loeb  would  take  the 
trouble  to  study  the  definition  which  St.  Thomas 
gives  of  the  vis  aesti mativa  in  animals,  he  would  find 
more  wisdom  in  that  one  definition  than  his  previous 
unacquaintance  with  that  author  had  ever  permitted 
him  to  suspect.  This  unacquaintance  with  the 
Scholastic  method  of  thinking  is  the  very  handicap 
which  makes  him  "conceal  the  problem' '  beneath  the 
veil  of  a  few  Greek  phrases. 

Loeb  as  well  as  Bethe,  Uexkuell  and  others  men- 
tion a  great  many  facts  1 )  of  a  nature  similar  to  the 
one  explained.  But  it  is  unnecessary  to  enter  upon 
tljem.  For  far  from  demonstrating  that  the  move- 
ments of  animals  are  merely  due  to  mechanical  causes, 
they  show  rather  the  evident  fact  that  some  kind  ol 
sensitive  cognition  guides  the  animal  in  the  perfor- 
mance of  its  instinctive  activity. 

But  we  may  ask,  does  sensitive  cognition  suffice  to 
explain  the  phenomena  of  instinct?  The  exterior  sen- 
ses as  such  certainly  do  not.  For  the  mere  preception 
of  something  green  will  not  induce  the  cow  to  eat;  for 
in  that  case  the  cow  would  eat  any  kind  of  green  mat- 
ter, poisonous  herbs  or  only  colored  paper.  But 
this  does  not  agree  with  facts.  On  the  contrary,  just 
as  hens  when  threatened  by  a  bird  of  prey  are  at  once 
aware  of  their  danger,  but  never  call  their  young  when 

l)  Cf.  E.  Wastnann,  S.  J.,  Instinkt  und  Intelligenz  im 
Tierreich,  Third  edition,  (Herder  1905),  p.  136-168. 

This  edition  of  Wasmann's  work  is  practically  a  new  book. 

Morever,  Wasmann,  Die  psychischen  Faehigkeiten  der 
Ameisen;  Zoologica,  Heft  26  (1899). 


50  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

the  bird  soaring  over  them  is  not  inimical,  thus  also  do 
cows  on  entering  a  meadow  for  the  first  time  distinguish 
most  exactly  between  nutritious  and  poisonous  herbs. 
Experiments  begun  by  Linne  have  brought  out 
the  fact,  that  of  all  herbs  within  their  reach  cows  se- 
lect about  276,  whilst  about  218  are  passed  by;  and 
precisely  those  276  correspond  to  the  cow's  organism, 
whilst  as  experience  proved  many  of  the  other  218  are 
of  a  poisonous  character.  If,  therefore ,  the  exterior  sen- 
ses alone  are  not  sufficient  to  explain  the  facts,  will  the 
interior  sense  give  us  a  satisfactory  answer  to  the 
question,  how  animals  are  enabled  with  such  unfail- 
ing certainty  to  distinguish  between  the  beneficial  and 
harmful?  Will  an  interior  sense  (sensus  communis) 
suffice  to  explain  that  wonderful  sagacity  of  animals, 
by  which  they  choose  their  proper  nourishment,  by 
which  they  adopt  the  most  appropriate  means  of  de- 
fence and  propagation?  If  the  animal's  interior  sense 
is  exactly  the  same  as  that  of  man,  then,  indeed,  we 
must  confess  that  the  phenomena  put  before  us  are  al- 
together inexplicable;  for  the  interior  sense  of  man 
as  such,  without  the  guidance  of  reason,  is  not  suffi- 
cient even  to  preserve  us  from  the  greatest  dangers. 
The  child  in  the  forest  smiles,  when  it  takes  the 
poisonous  berry;  and  its  tender  life  is  preserved  only 
by  the  care  of  a  loving  mother,  who  is  endowed  with 
reason,  until  its  own  dormant  intellect  is  active  and 
begins  to  be  its  guide.  Must  we  then  fall  back  on  an  in- 
tellect to  explain  facts  otherwise  inexplicable  in  the 
instinctive  actions  of  animals!  Must  we  defend 
Brehm's  ridiculous  dolls?  If  so,  we  must  go  farther 
than  Brehm  went,  and  ascribe  to  animals  an  intelli- 


INSTINCT  AND  SENSUOUS  CONGITIOX.  53 

gence  far  superior  to  our  own;  we  must  bow  down  be- 
fore the  animal,  which  manifests  from  the  very  first 
day  of  its  existence  a  degree  of  wisdom  that  men 
acquire  only  after  years  of  experience  and  labor- 
ious study.  Let  us  not  forget  the  example  of  the 
Rhynchites  betulae,  but  remember  how  this  tinj^ 
beetle  "without  any  study  solves  mathematical 
and  technical  problems,  which  the  mind  of  man  has 
brooded  over  for  centuries;  how  at  the  very  first  trial 
it  performs  its  work  with  the  greatest  perfection, 
though  no  parents,  no  brothers  or  sisters  were  its 
teachers,  though  no  experience  extending  over  years 
developed  the  use  of  its  faculties;  how  with  mar- 
vellous anticipation  it  provides  for  future  circumstan- 
ces, of  which  it  could  have  no  notion  whatsoever 
either  by  its  own  experience  or  by  human  ratioci- 
nation; how  in  fine  under  ordinary  circumstances  it 
communicates  to  its  work  such  manifold  perfection  and 
such  appropriateness  for  the  desired  purpose  that  the 
thousands  of  specimens  of  man's  art  and  industry  seem 
to  be  the  unfinished  work  of  an  apprentice."  l) 
Undoubtedly  an  intelligence  is  manifest  in  the  instinc- 
tive actions  of  animals  which  evidently  surpasses  that 
of  man.  And  yet  the  elder  Agassiz  and  his  followers 
err  in  attributing  this  intelligence  to  the  animal  itself 
and  in  maintaining  that  in  the  question  of  spiritual 
faculties  man  should  not  arrogate  to  himself  a  privi- 
leged position  in  the  animal  creation.  This  sup- 
position not  only  destroys  the  dignity  of  man  and 
elevates  the  animal  to  a  sort  of  God-like  being,  but 
brings  us  into  collision  with  indisputable  facts.  In- 
')  E.  Wasmann,  S.  J.,  Der  Trichterwickler,  1884,  p.  56. 


52  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

deed,  as  we  have  proved,  there  is  no  greater  error 
imaginable,  than  to  attribute  to  animals,  when  acting 
instinctively,  an  intellect  similar  to  that  of  man.  If 
then  the  animal  acting  under  the  laws  of  instinct  can- 
not boast  even  of  a  human  intelligence,  then  all  in- 
telligence of  a  higher  kind  is  a  fortiori  excluded. 
No,  the  superhuman  intelligence,  radiating,  as  it  were, 
from  all  instinctive  activity,  does  not  abide  in  the  ani- 
mal itself.  On  the  contrary,  we  are  impelled  with 
logical  necessity  by  most  evident  facts  to  acknowledge 
a  being  which  many  nowadays  are  so  surprisingly  loath 
to  admit,  namely,  a  divine  Intelligence,  distinct  from 
the  animal  and  from  the  whole  creation,  a  personal 
God,  infinitely  wise  and  powerful.  But  since  it  is  re- 
pugnant that  this  God  personally  governs  the  animal's 
instinctive  activity  by  endless  miracles,  we  have  to  as- 
sume that  the  Infinite  has  inscribed  in  the  animal  as 
in  every  living  being  an  immanent  law  according  to 
which  the  animal  by  its  own  activity  performs  its  in- 
stinctive actions.  And  wherein  does  this  law  consist? 
As  we  have  seen  the  facts  do  not  allow  us  to  assign  to  the 
animal  when  acting  instinctively  a  higher  faculty  than 
sensitive  cognition  and  appetency.  Consequently,  we 
have  to  infer  that  the  law  imprinted  in  the  animal-soul 
consists  in  this  very  sensitive  cognition  and  appetency, 
qualified  in  such  a  way  that,  as  St.  Thomas  says, 
"what  is  the  specific  object  of  pleasure  to  the  animal" 
is  at  the  same  time  "the  best  and  most  appropriate  ob- 
ject of  its  well  being. ' ' 

What,  therefore,  is  our  definition  of  instinct?  L,add 
says:  "The  simple  fact  is  that  we  find  men  and  the 
lower  animals  generally,  using  the  structure  with 


INSTINCT  AND  SENSUOUS  COGNITION.  53 

which  they  are  gifted  by  nature,  in  ways  significant  of 
feelings  of  craving,  of  anticipations  of  ends,  and  of 
adaptation  of  means  which  considered  in  themselves 
imply  far  higher  degrees  of  conscious  ideation  than,  so 
far  as  we  can  judge,  really  exists.  To  such  complex 
conditions  of  consciousness  with  their  motor  accom- 
paniments we  give  the  term  instincts. "  x )  In  other 
words:  Instinct  consists  in  the  sensuous  cognition 
and  appetency  of  the  agent,  which . enables  it  to  per- 
form purposeful  actions  without  becoming  conscious 
of  the  purpose  as  such.  The  satisfaction  of  the  ani- 
mal's cravings  guided  by  sense-experience  normally 
coincides  with  its  general  welfare.  How  instinctive 
actions  are  actually  performed  by  the  agent,  which 
nerves  and  which  parts  of  the  spinal  cord  and  brain 
come  into  play,  how  external  stimuli  affect  the  end- 
organs  of  sense  and  set  up  a  nerve-commotion  that  is 
propagated  to  the  brain  and  finally  acts  upon  the  ani- 
mal soul  to  elicit  a  purposeful  action,  all  this  is  "sec- 
ondary and  of  no  moment  for  our  present  dissertation. 
For  our  purpose  it  is  sufficient  to  have  brought  out  the 
principal  characteristics  of  instinct  and  instinctive  ac- 
tivities which  are  (1)  final  tendency  without  con- 
sciousness of  final  tendency;  (2)  sensuous  cognition 
and  appetency  normally  combining  "the  specific  object 
of  pleasure  to  the  animal"  "with  the  best  and  most 
appropriate  object  of  its  well-being. ' ' 

l)  I.e.,  p.  600. 


CHAPTER  V. 
Instinct  and  Sense-Experience. 

J  NSTINCTIVE  actions  are  not  absolutely  uniform 
and  infallible.  On  the  contrary,  they  may  be  mod- 
ified by  experience.  Ants  kept  in  artificial  nests 
generally  fall  with  fury  upon  any  strange  object  intro- 
duced into  their  midst.  But  this  behavior  may  be 
modified.  If  a  piece  of  ice  is  thrown  among  them, 
they  first  attack  it  violently.  Soon,  however,  they 
experience  the  fatal  cold  and  retreat,  taking  sooner  or 
later  a  "lesson"  for  the  future.  The  question  is 
whether  this  element  of  experience  changes  the  nature 
of  an  instinctive  action  and  elevates  it  to  the  rank  of 
such  as  proceed  from  intelligence. 

As  we  have  indicated,  it  is  the  general  opinion  of 
modern  naturalists,  that  only  those  actions  of  animals 
are  instinctive  which  immediately  arise  from  heredi- 
tary disposition,  whilst  all  those  which  pre -suppose 
individual  experience  are  due  to  intelligence. 

Mr.  George  W.  Peckham  of  Milwaukee,  who  has 
written  some  interesting  papers  on  spiders  and  a  splen- 
did monograph  on  the  instincts  and  habits  of  wasps, 
explains  this  general  opinion  as  follows:  "Under  the 
term  instinct  we  place  all  complex  acts  that  are  per- 
formed previous  to  experience  and  in  a  similar  manner 
by  all  members  of  the  same  sex  and  race,  leaving  out 
as  non-essential,  at  this  time,  the  question  of  whether 

(54) 


INSTINCT  AND  SENSE-EXPERIENCE.  55 

they  are  or  are  not  accompanied  by  consciousness. 
Under  intelligence  we  place  those  conscious  actions 
which  are  more  or  less  modifiable  by  experience. "  * ) 

Therefore,  whenever  an  animal  makes  use  of  a  for- 
mer experience  or  adapts  its  manner  of  acting  to  the 
changed  conditions  of  its  surroundings,  its  actions  are 
manifestations  of  intellect;  and  vice  versa,  whenever 
the  animal  is  determined  by  inherited  impulses  its  ac- 
tions are  merely  instinctive.  In  other  words,  if  we 
have  to  decide  in  a  given  case  whether  an  animal  acts 
instinctively  or  intellectually,  we  must  answer  the 
question:  "Did  any  previous  or  actual  experience 
modify  the  action  or  not?"  If  the  answer  is  affirm- 
ative, that  is  to  say,  if  the  animal  was  influenced  by 
experience  to  adopt  an  appropriate  deviation  from  its 
general  way  of  acting,  the  action  is  said  to  be  the  re- 
sult of  intelligence;  if  the  answer  is  negative,  the  ac- 
tion must  be  ascribed  to  instinct. 

What  are  we  to  think  of  this  criterion? 

Let  us  see:  A  criterion  is  a  sign  or  characteristic 
mark  which  enables  us  to  discriminate  with  certainty 
and  under  all  circumstances  between  two  or  more  ob- 
jects or  actions.  Consequently,  its  first  and  most  es- 
sential quality  consists  in  this,  that  the  mark  or  sign 
of  distinction  is  not  common  to  the  objects  or  actions 
between  which  we  have  to  discriminate.  Hence,  if  it 
can  be  proved,  that  there  are  actions  which  in  spite  of 
modification  by  experience  are  undoubtedly  of  instinc- 
tive nature,  the  generally  accepted  criterion  of  distinc- 
tion between  instinctive  and  intellectual  activity  is 

!)  1.  c.,    p.  231. 


56  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

evidently  false,  because  the  characteristic  sign  of  dis- 
crimination is  common  to  both  species  of  actions.  Is 
this  the  case? 

Speaking  of  the  so-called  Pelopaei  (Mud- Daubers), 
Mr.  Peckham  says,  that  "originally  they  built  under 
overhanging  rocks  and  in  hollow  trees. "  And  now, 
"when  near  human  habitations  these  wasps  make  use 
of  the  more  convenient  positions  which  they  offer. ' ' 
'  'The  spot  chosen  for  the  nest  may  be  in  a  barn  up 
among  the  rafters,  in  an  outhouse,  under  the  roof  of  a 
porch,  or,  indeed,  in  any  sheltered  place  where  it  will 
be  protected."  x)  According  to  Mr.  Peckham's 
criterion,  the  former  mode  of  building  in  hollow  trees 
is  instinctive,  whereas  the  latter  mode  of  building  in 
house -chimneys  is  an  intelligent  act.  For  the  former 
does  not  depend  on  any  experience  whatsoever,  whilst 
the  latter  is  a  modification  of  the  former,  due  to  actual 
experience.  And  in  reality  Mr.  Peckham  enumerates 
this  example  among  the  instances  which  he  advances 
for  the  intelligence  of  wasps. 

But  does  the  experience  which  influenced  the  for- 
mer mode  of  action  change  its  instinctive  nature? 

Every  wasp  is  endowed  with  instinct.  Hence  it  pos- 
sesses the  inherited  faculty  of  forming  associations  of 
sense  perceptions  and  feelings  necessary  for  the  preser- 
vation of  its  species.  But  the  single  associations  as 
such  are  not  inherited.  For,  if  this  were  the  case,  we 
would  have  to  assume  special  innate  forms  of  cognition 
representing  the  exterior  objects  of  every  one  of 
the  thousands  and  thousands  of  instinctive  actions  of 
animals.  But  this  assumption  is  as  extravagant  as  it 

>)  I.e.,  p.  177. 


INSTINCT  AND  SENSE-EXPERIENCE.  57 

is  uncalled  for.  If,  then,  our  wasp  is  wont  to  build 
its  -house  of  loam  in  a  hollow  tree,  this  act  is  not  de- 
termined by  an  innate  representation  of  this  or  that 
tree,  but  by  an  instinctive  faculty  which  enables  the 
wasp,  unconsciously,  to  combine  with  its  impulse  to 
build  a  nest  the  representation  of  any  hollow  tree. 
Otherwise  we  would  have  to  assume  that  an  immense 
"picture-gallery"  of  all  possible  kinds  of  hollow  trees 
pre-existed  in  the  soul  and  ganglion  centres  of  the 
wasp.  For  these  wasps  do  not  restrict  their  nest-build- 
ing to  trees  of  a  special  shape  and  form,  but  select 
any  trees  that  seem  fit  for  the  purpose.  It  is 
evident  that  the  wasp's  action  in  selecting  chimneys, 
where  they  are  to  be  found,  must  be  explained  by  the 
very  same  psychological  laws  which  influence  the  se- 
lection of  a  hollow  tree  where  no  more  convenient 
object  is  to  be  met  with.  For,  if  the  wasp  has  the  instinc- 
tive faculty  of  combining  the  sensuous  perception  of  any 
appropriate  object  with  the  corresponding  sensitive  im- 
pulse, why  should  this  faculty  not  suffice  for  selecting 
any  other  appropriate  place  instead  of  a  tree?  Indeed, 
the  only  difference  between  the  two  actions  lies  in 
this,  that  the  perception  of  a  chimney  is  more  readily 
combined  with  the  respective  instinctive  impulse  than 
the  perception  of  a  hollow  tree. 

Consequently,  the  wasp's  second  action,  which  is 
modified  by  sensuous  experience,  belongs  equally  to 
the  domain  of  instinct,  and  the  above-mentioned  cri- 
terion does  not  express  the  real  difference  between  in- 
stinctive and  intelligent  activity.  1) 

*)  The  following  examples  illustrate  the  same  conclusion: 
Everybody  admits  that  children  instinctively  shrink  from  a 


58  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

We  may  affirm  this  conclusion  with  still  greater 
confidence,  as  almost  all  the  examples  brought  for- 
ward by  Mr.  Peckham  are  similar  to  the  one  we  have 

chosen Even  when  there  is  question  of  a  whole 

series  of  sense  perceptions  which  are  associated  with 
each  other  and  modify  the  action  of  the  animal,  the 
criterion  of  the  defenders  of  animal  intelligence  cannot 
be  admitted,  as  instinct  always  implies  the  faculty  of 
combining  any  sensuous  perception  unconsciously  with 
its  corresponding  impulse.  Hence  it  is  an  arbitrary 
assertion  to  maintain  that  this  faculty  does  not  suffice 
or  that  it  loses  its  character,  when  there  is  question. of 
many  sensitive  perceptions  or  of  those  which  arise  in 
the  sensitive  memory  of  the  animal.  As  long  as  we 
remain  within  the  realm  of  merely  sensuous  cognition, 
there  is  no  reason  for  calling  upon  a  higher  faculty. 
But,  there  is  one  example  in  Mr.  Peckham's  book 
which  seems  to  be  of  a  different  nature  from  the  one 
explained  above.  Let  us  shortly  consider  the  inter- 
esting case.  Peckham's  description  is  as  follows: 

red  hot  iron.  But  this  manner  of  acting  is  due  to  experience. 
For,  as  we  all  know,  children  shrink  from  a  glowing  piece  of 
iron  only  after  having  experienced  the  painful  consequence 
of  touching  it  on  a  former  occasion.  "A  burnt  child  shuns 
the  fire."  Hence  an  action,  though  modified  by  experience, 
does  not  necessarily  lose  its  instinctive  character.  Moreover, 
the  above  mentioned  criterion  eliminates  from  the  realm  of 
instinctive  activity  every  action,  from  which  the  element  of 
experience  cannot  be  dissociated.  As  soon  as  a  new-born  pup 
begins  to  suck,  ^.experiences  the  pleasant  taste  of  its  mother's 
milk,  and  its  experience  enters  into  and  influences  the  con- 
tinuation of  the  action.  Consequently,  an  instinctive  action 
would  cease  to  be  instinctive,  as  soon  as  it  commences. 


INSTINCT  AND  SENSE-EXPERIENCE.  59 

"Just  here  must  be  told  the  story  of  one  Httle  wasp 
whose  individuality  stands  out  in  our  mind  more  dis- 
tinctly than  that  of  any  of  the  others.  We  remember 
her  as  the  most  fastidious  and  perfect  little  worker  of 
the  whole  season,  so  nice  was  she  in  her  adaptation  of 
means  to  ends,  so  busy  and  contented  in  her  labor  of 
love,  and  so  pretty  in  her  pride  over  her  completed 
work.  In  filling  up  her  nest  she  put  her  head  down 
into  it  and  bit  away  the  loose  earth  from  the  sides, 
letting  it  fall  to  the  bottom  of  the  burrow,  and  then, 
after  a  quantity  had  accumulated  jammed  it  down 
with  her  head.  Earth  was  then  brought  from  the  out- 
side and  pressed  in,  and  then  more  was  bitten  from 
the  sides.  When,  at  last,  the  filling  was  level  with 
the  ground,  she  brought  a  quantity  of  fine  grains  of 
dirt  to  the  spot  and  picking  up  a  small  pebble  in  her 
mandibles,  used  it  as  a  hammer  in  pounding  them 
down  with  rapid  strokes,  thus  making  this  spot  as 
hard  and  firm  as  the  surrounding  surfaces  (Plate  II, 
Fig.  2) .  Before  we  could  recover  from  our  astonish- 
ment at  this  performance  she  had  dropped  her  stone 
and  was  bringing  more  earth.  We  then  threw  our- 
selves down  on  the  ground  that  not  a  motion  might 
be  lost,  and  in  a  moment  we  saw  her  pick  up  the  peb- 
ble and  again  pound  the  earth  into  place  with  it, 
hammering  now  here  and  now  there  until  all  was 
level.  Once  more  the  whole  process  was  repeated, 
and  then  the  little  creature,  all  unconscious  of  the 
commotion  that  she  had  aroused  in  our  minds,  uncon- 
scious indeed  of  our  very  existence  and  intent  only  on 
doing  her  work  and  doing  it  well,  gave  one  final, 


60  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

comprehensive  glance  around  and  flew  away."  *) 
We  do  not  believe  that  Mr.  Peckham's  interpreta- 
tion of  the  facts  is  warranted  by  what  he  actually  saw. 
The  simple  fact  seems  to  be  as  follows:  The  pebble 
happened  to  be  somewhat  larger  than  the  other  ma- 
terial used  in  closing  the  nest.  Anxious  to  fill  up  the 
burrow  as  perfectly  as  possible  the  wasp  made  a  num- 
ber of  attempts  to  press  the  pebble  into  the  ground. 
But  all  was  in  vain.  The  wasp  did  not  succeed  in 
forcing  the  pebble  into  the  ground,  so  that  all  would 
be  perfectly  level.  Hence  after  repeated  trials  she 
abandoned  the  pebble  altogether.  The  fact  that  the 
wasp  took  up  a  pebble  somewhat  larger  than  usual  is 
not  wonderful  at  all,  since  it  often  makes  use  of  a 
pebble  of  considerable  size  to  deposit  it  into  the  lower 
part  of  the  newly  made  nest.  Hence  we  are  not  dis- 
posed to  accept  Peckham's  claim  that  the  wasp  "im- 
provised a  tool  and  made  intelligent  use  of  it". 

We  distinguish  therefore  two  kinds  of  instinctive 
actions,  both  proceeding  from  the  self-same  sensuous 
cognition  and  appetency.  But  while  the  first  group 
springs  directly  from  the  inherited  dispositions  of  the 
agent's  sensitive  faculties,  the  second  group  implies  a 
modification  of  the  actions  through  sense-experience. 
We  do  not  insist  upon  mere  names;  and  if  any  one 
prefers  to  introduce  another  phrase  for  designating  in- 
stinctive action  modified  by  sense-experience,  he  may 
do  so.  But  no  matter  what  term  he  may  choose,  the 
word  "intelligence"  (that  is  rational  intelligence)  is 
out  of  place,  unless  of  course  the  word  is  taken  in  a 

*)  1.  c.,  p.  22-23.    There  is  a  second  fact  recorded  by  Mr. 
Williston,  which  is  of  a  similar  nature. 


INSTINCT  AND  SENSE-EXPERIENCE.  61 

merely  analogous  sense.  For  that  word  conveys  the 
idea  that  all  actions  modified  by  sense-experience  nec- 
essarily imply  consciousness  of  finality,  which  is  posi- 
tively false.  Prof.  Wheeler  says  against  Wasmann 
"that  he  has  overshot  the  mark  and  attempted  to  in- 
clude too  much  in  his  conception  of  instinct."  "I 
should  continue,  therefore,"  he  adds,  "to  emphasize 
the  difference  between  activities  which  are  compelled 
by  inherited  mechanism  and  those  which  imply  choice 
on  the  part  of  the  individual  organism.  For  the  latter 
the  term  "intelligence"  has  been  so  very  generally 
used  that  it  seems  both  hopeless  and  idle  to  restrict  it, 
as  Wasmann  so  emphatically  desires,  to  the  ratiocina- 
tive  process  in  its  clearest  manifestations. "  x )  We  do 
not  deny  that  true  choice  supposes  intelligence.  But 
we  do  deny  that  instinctive  actions  modified  by  sense- 
experience  necessarily  imply  choice.  What  is 
"choice?"  The  Standard  dictionary  answers  "that 
power  of  the  will  by  which  one  freely  prefers  and  se- 
lects as  an  end  of  action  some  one  good  out  of  those 
presented  to  the  mind. ' '  This  definition  is  clear  and 
to  the  point.  It  evidently  supposes  that  the  one  who 
chooses  compares  two  or  more  objects  with  each  other 
and  having  understood  the  relation  of  them  to  himself 
freely  selects  the  one  and  rejects  the  rest.  Here  is  an 
illustration  w7ell  adapted  for  our  purpose:  On  May 
5th,  1905  we  arranged  an  ant  nest  for  I^asius  interjectus 
consisting  of  two  compartments  connected  by  a  small 
opening.  Compartment  No.  1  was  dark,  dry  and  with- 
out earth ;  compartment  No.  2  was  light  and  contained 
earth.  About  100  ants  with  some  40  young  larvae 
l)  1.  c.,  p.  809. 


62  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

were  introduced  into  compartment  No.  2.  Within  15 
minutes  all  had  withdrawn  into  the  dark  compartment 
No.  1.  On  the  following  day  the  earth  in  compart- 
ment No.  2  was  moistened.  Soon  the  ants  moved 
over  from  No.  1  into  No.  2.  But  after  some  six  hours 
the  ants  commenced  with  carrying  over  the  moist  earth 
from  No.  2  into  No.  1  which  now  was  moist,  dark  and 
contained  earth  and  thus  was  most  comfortable.  The 
action  of  the  ants  implies  "choice"  in  as  far  as  the 
one  compartment  is  preferred  to  the  other.  But  this  is 
not  "choice"  in  its  proper  meaning.  The  ants  simply 
do  and  must  do  what  they  experience  to  be  more 
agreeable  to  their  senses.  The  concrete  moist  and 
dark  compartment  affects  them  more  pleasantly  than 
the  other,  and  this  concrete  perception  awakens  the 
concrete  desire  to  be  in  the  more  comfortable  com- 
partment, which  again  is  followed  by  the  appropriate 
locomotion  of  certain  organs.  But  there  is  no  indica- 
tion of  the  ants  becoming  conscious  of  the  abstract 
relation  between  the  various  conditiona  of  the  two 
compartments  to  each  other  and  to  their  own  welfare. 
Nor  is  there  any  trace  of  a  free  determination  upon 
some  alternative. 

Choice  implies  logical  thought  and  the  power 
of  abstraction.  For  without  becoming  conscious  of 
the  purpose  of  the  action  as  such,  without  knowing 
and  understanding  why  the  one  object  is  to  be  pre- 
ferred to  another,  a  true  and  free  choice  is  impossible. 
It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  instinctive  actions  modified 
by  sense-experience  do  not  necessarily  imply 
choice.  Otherwise  we  would  have  to  admit  that  the 
wasp  mentioned  above  compares  hollow  trees  and 


INSTINCT  AND  SENSE-EXPERIENCE.  63 

chimneys  and,  having  studied  and  understood  at  least 
some  advantages  afforded  by  either,  freely  decides  to 
depart  from  the  traditions  of  its  race  and  select  chimneys 
for  its  future  nest.  We  need  not  repeat  that  such  an 
assumption  is  unwarranted.  The ' '  choice ' '  of  the  wasp 
is  no  real  "choice."  In  fact,  it  implies  no  more 
"choice"  than  many  an  action  preceeding  from  in- 
herited dispositions,  such  as  distinguishing  true  food 
from  poison  and  all  indifferent  material.  The  wasp 
"selects"  a  chimney,  simply  because  it  has  the  in- 
herited faculty  at  a  suitable  time  to  react  appropriately 
upon  a  concrete  sensitive  impression  made  upon  it  by 
a  concrete  suitable  object  without  becoming  conscious 
of  the  appropriateness  of  the  action.  It  is  anything 
but  sensitive  cognition  and  appetency,  and  there  is  no 
reason  for  attributing  it  to  a  higher  faculty  of  abstrac- 
tion and  logical  thought. 

We  agree,  therefore,  with  Prof.  Wheeler  when 
he  calls  choice  a  characteristic  mark  of  intelligence,  but 
we  differ  from  him  when  he  asserts  that  modification 
by  sense-experience  necessarily  implies  choice.  Be- 
sides we  believe  Prof.  Wheeler  does  not  lay  sufficient 
stress  on  the  fact  above  demonstrated  that  instinctive 
activities  even  in  as  far  as  they  proceed  from  an  inherit- 
ed mechanism  are  directed  by  sensuous  cognition  and 
appetency  and  hence  that  they  differ  from  merely  re- 
flex actions  which  include  no  sensuous  consciousness 
whatever.  For  Wheeler  simply  speaks  of  "actions 
compelled  by  inherited  mechanism, ' '  a  definition  which 
is  certainly  incomplete  and  characteristic  of  reflex 
actions. 

We      conclude,    therefore,    that    Prof.     Wheeler, 


64  THE  HUMANIZING  OP  THE  BRUTE. 

as  well  as  most  modern  naturalists,  defend  a  con- 
cept of  instinct  which  does  not  apply  to  instinct 
at  all,  but  to  intelligence  and  to  reflex  actions.  Let 
us  now  proceed  to  define  more  accurately  the  true  dis- 
tinction and  criterion  of  discrimination  between  in- 
stinct and  intelligence. 


CHAPTER  VI. 
Instinct   and  Intelligence. 

"VW"  HAT  is  the  true  criterion  of  distinction  between 
instinct  and  intelligence? 

A  brief  exposition  of  the  nature  of  an  intelligent 
act  will  furnish  an  answer  to  this  question.  We  may 
define  intelligent,  in  opposition  to  instinctive,  activity 
as  one  that  is  performed  with  perfect  consciousness  of 
its  tendency,  and  is  consequently  guided  by  a  purely 
spiritual  faculty  of  cognition  and  appetite. 

The  first  part  of  this  definition  is  self-evident, 
and  sufficiently  characterizes  intelligent  activity. 
Moreover,  it  is  generally  admitted.  Thus  Emery 
describes  intelligence  as  the  faculty  of  abstracting 
general  ideas  from  the  multiplex  phantasms  which 
have  been  acquired  by  experience,  and  of  utilizing 
them  in  connection  with  sensuous  images  to  perform 
actions  which  imply  a  conscious  final  tendency.  And, 
strange  as  it  may  sound,  all  our  opponents  without 
exception,  notwithstanding  their  own  false  criterion, 
endeavor  to  prove  the  intelligence  of  animals  by 
ascribing  to  them  a  consciousness  of  final  tendency. 
They  do  not  commit  the  absurdity  of  denying  the  ne- 
cessity of  this  tendency  for  such  actions  as  the  plan- 
ning of  houses,  the  framing  of  laws,  the  solution  of 
mathematical  problems  and  all  purely  intelligent  act- 
ivity, but  readily  admit  that  this  very  consciousness 

(65) 


66  THK  HUMANIZING  OK  THE  BRUTE. 

of  finality  raises  these  actions  to  the  level  of  intelli- 
gence. It  would,  therefore,  be  a  quixotic  fight 
against  wind-mills  to  prove  that  the  essence  of  an  in- 
telligent action  demands  the  consciousness  of  its  final- 
ity. No,  the  question  at  issue  reaches  much  further. 
Wasmann  lodges  the  complaint  against  Romanes, 
that  he  claims  intelligence  for  all  actions  of  animals 
that  are  based  on  sensuous  experience,  although  he 
simultaneously  acknowledges  that  intelligence  con- 
sists in  the  power  of  drawing  logical  conclusions. 

Wheeler,  too,  as  we  have  seen,  makes  "intelli- 
gence" dependent  on  manifestations  of  ''choice"  and 
Peckham  declares  that  intelligence  is  the  power  which 
"enables  an  insect  to  seek,  accept,  refuse,  choose, — 
to  decline  to  make  use  of  this  or  to  turn  to  account 
some  other  thing. "  l )  But  both  Wheeler  and  Peckham 
maintain  at  the  same  time  that  modification  in  con- 
sequence of  sense-experience  renders  instinctive  ac- 
tions intelligent.  It  is  this  deplorable  contradiction 
which  touches  the  vital  point  in  the  argumentation  of 
eve n  the  most  moderate  defenders  of  animal  intelli- 
gence. 

They  consider  consciousness  of  purpose  as  inseparable 
from  ///e  utilization  of  experience;  wherever  there  is 
sensuous]experience  there  is  consciousness  of  purpose, 
and  vice  -versa.  Their  criterion  states  that  every  ac- 
tion is  intelligent  that  is  appropriately  modified  by  any 
kind  of  experience;  and  still  they  insist  on  the  con- 
sciousness of  final  tendency  as  the  real  essence  of  in- 
telligent activity.  Hence  in  their  view  the  appropriate 
modification  of  an  action  by  experience  and  conscious- 

';  1.  c.,  p.  231. 


INSTINCT  AND  INTELLIGENCE.  67 

ness  of  its  finality  are  so  intimately  connected  that 
the  one  necessarily  presupposes  the  other.  But  this 
is  the  fundamental  tenet  of  materialism  and  destroys 
the  true  nature  of  an  intelligent  act.  Consciousness  of 
piirpose  is  impossible  without  spiritual  cognition.  They 
are  identical,  and  therefore  our  definition  adds  that  an 
intelligent  act  is  guided  by  a  purely  spiritual  faculty 
of  cognition  and  appetite.  The  whole  question  de- 
pends on  the  proof  of  this  last  inference. 

Let  us  open  the  argument  with  an  illustration. 
We  select  that  of  the  babe  in  the  cradle.  Its  reason- 
ing faculty  is  still  dormant.  It  is  hungry  and  cries. 
Its  mother  puts  a  milk  bottle  into  its  hands.  For  a 
moment  its  desires  are  appeased.  But  soon  the  same 
scene  has  to  be  repeated,  until  finally  the  child  finds 
the  bottle  of  itself,  when  it  feels  the  pangs  of  hunger. 
No  one  will  dare  to  affirm  that  it  has  attained  the  use 
of  reason,  and  yet  no  one  can  deny,  that  in  conse- 
quence of  repeated  experience  in  some  way  or  other 
the  feeling  of  hunger  and  the  milk-bottle  are  connect- 
ed in  the  child's  perception.  Otherwise  it  is  impossi- 
ble to  explain  why  the  child  constantly  grasps  the  bot- 
tle when  it  is  hungry.  But  who  will  maintain  that 
the  babe  acts  with  consciousness  of  the  finality  of  its 
action? 

Here  is  another  example.  When  Rhynchites  be- 
tulse  feels  the  natural  impulse  to  lay  eggs,  it  in- 
variably prepares  a  funnel-shaped  depository  and 
lays  its  eggs  in  the  folds  of  this  artistic  bed.  It  evi- 
dently perceives  in  some  way  a  connection  between 
the  funnel  and  its  impulse  to  lay  eggs.  Otherwise 
this  beetle  would  neither  prepare  the  funnel  nor  al- 


68  THE  HUMANIZING  OP  THE  BRUTE. 

ways  place  its  egg  precisely  in  the  requisite  folds,  but 
would  at  least,  once  in  a  while,  deposit  them  else- 
where, on  a  more  convenient  spot.  But,  does  this 
perception  warrant  the  conclusion  that  R.  betulae  acts 
with  consciousness  of  finality?  Undoubtedly  not. 
For  an  action  that  is  guided  by  "purpose"  and  per- 
formed with  "consciousness"  demands  far  more  than 
a  me  re  combination  of  the  phantasms  of  things  which 
are  related  to  each  other  as  means  and  end.  This  very 
relation  of  end  and  -means  must  be  clearly  recognized 
as  such.  Or,  as  St.  Thomas  puts  it:  "The  perfect 
knowledge  of  an  end  demands  not  only  the  perception 
of  the  object  which  constitutes  that  end,  but  its  recog- 
nition as  an  end  and  its  relation  to  the  means  used  to 
attain  it."  But  this  evidently  implies  the  formal 
cognition  of  finality,  the  clear  perception  of  the  ab- 
stract relation  between  means  and  end.  When  a  man 
wants  to  enjoy  his  breakfast  with  consciousness  of  final- 
ity, it  is  not  sufficient  to  combine  in  his  imagination 
the  concrete  things  before  him  and  his  concrete  im- 
pulse to  eat  them,  a  combination  which  naturally  pro- 
duces an  agreeable  feeling  and  calls  forth  an  appro- 
piate  exercise  of  the  limbs  towards  the  breakfast 
table,  but  he  must  understand  the  abstract  relation 
between  the  savory  beef-steak  as  the  means  and  the 
satisfaction  of  his  hunger  as  the  end,  and  guided  by 
this  cognition  he  must  eat  his  breakfast. 

Therefore,  every  action  that  is  guided  by  "purpose' ' 
and  directed  by  "consciousness  of  purpose"  presup- 
poses as  least  requisite  the  cognition  of  means  and  end  as 
such,  of  relations  as  such,  and  consequently  implies 
universal  ideas.  Thus  far  few  of  our  opponents  will  find 


INSTINCT  AND  INTELLIGENCE.  69 

any  difficulty  in  admitting  our  argument.  But  our 
way  s  separate ,  when  we  put  the  question :  Is  a  sensitive 
power  of  cognition  able  to  form  general  notions  or  not? 

To  answer  this  question  we  must  first  of  all  inquire 
into  the  nature  of  a  universal  idea  and  investigate  its 
main  difference  from  a  so-called  common  phantasm. 
When  Clarke  1)  calls  the  distinction  between  the 
abstract  idea  and  the  common  phantasm  of  the  imag- 
ination "the  very  touchstone  of  a  philosophical  sys- 
tem", he  enunciates  a  truth  that  is  of  paramount  im- 
portance in  our  present  investigation.  Everywhere  in 
the  writings  of  those  who  defend  animal  intelligence, 
abstract  ideas  and  common  phantasms  are  essentially 
alike  or,  at  the  most,  described  as  different  degrees  of  one 
and  the  same  faculty  of  abstraction.  Dr.  Forel  even 
calls  a  universal  idea  "a  general  sensory  idea"  "like 
the  idea  'ant  enemy"2);  and  L,add,  who  is  one  of 
the  least  offenders  in  most  of  his  philosophical  views, 
deplores  the  fact  that  "much  confusion  has  always 
arisen  in  psychological  discussion  on  account  of  the 
very  natural  use  of  the  word  'idea'  for  both  the  con- 
crete sensuous  image  and  the  concept  or  product  oi 
thought"  3). 

What,  then,  is  a  common  phantasm? 

When,  before  sunrise,  a  fisherman  unmoors  his 
boat  in  the  pleasant  anticipation  of  a  rich  haul,  his 
imagination  is  naturally  enough  occupied  with  the 
picture  of  a  fine  fish.  In  spite  of  the  general  resem- 

*)  Richard  F.  Clarke,  S.J.,  Logic,  ed.  3.,  p.  123. 

2)  Ants   and   Some  other    Insects,   (Religion  of   Science 
Library)  No.  56,  p.  22. 

3)  1.  c.,  p.  378. 


70  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

blance  to  the  fishy  tribe  this  imaginary  fish  is  alto- 
gether void  of  any  universality,  and  represents  merely 
an  individual  fish.  Let  us  try  to  eliminate  the  quali- 
ties in  which  it  differs  from  other  fish  and  bring  out 
those  which  it  has  in  common  with  them.  Can  this 
image  now  be  called  universal?  Or  must  we  not  con- 
cede, that  in  spite  of  a  great  similarity  with  fish  in 
general  the  image  is  still  concrete  and  individual?  It 
may  be  that  the  discriminating  marks  are  less  promi- 
nent, but  the  common  marks  of  all  fish,  as  form,  color, 
fins,  are  still,  as  it  were,  in  the  foreground  of  our 
imagination.  The  image  is  and  remains  the  represen- 
tation of  an  individual  fish.  We  may  make  as  many 
efforts  as  we  like,  as  long  as  the  fish  remains  a  product 
of  our  imagination  we  can  never  deprive  it  of  all  definite 
shape  and  color,  and  of  definite  extension.  "I  can  con- 
sider," says  Berkeley,  "the  hand,  the  eye,  the  nose, 
each  by  itself  abstracted  and  separated  from  the  rest 
of  the  body.  But,  then,  whatever  hand  or  eye  I  -im- 
agine, it  must  have  some  particular  shape  and  color' '  x ) . 
As  long  as  the  representation  of  an  object  possesses 
color  and  extension  it  is  not  universal.  What  infer- 
ence have  we  to  make  from  this  conclusion?  It  is 
this,  that  there  are  no  real  universal  phantasms, 
and  that  the  abstractive  faculty  of  the  imagination 
consists  merely  in  the  weaker  or  stronger  representation 
of  sensitive  perceptions. 

The  common  phantasm,  either  as  an  act  or  the  rep- 
resentation of  an  object,  is  and  remains  individual. 
Or,  as  Clarke  has  it:  "The  common  phantasm  is  not 
really  common  at  all.  It  is  simply  an  individual 

l)  Michael  Maher,  S.J.,  Psychology  ed.  4.,  p.  236. 


INSTINCT  AND  INTELLIGENCE.  71 

phantasm,  rendered  so  vague  and  indistinct  by  the 
separation  from  it  of  its  distinguishing  characteristics 
that  it  will  stand  just  as  well,  or  just  as  badly,  for  one 
individual  as  another".  x) 

The  case  is  -very  different  with  universal  ideas.  It 
is  true,  that  they  are  so  closely  connected  with  com- 
mon phantasms  that  we  are  unable  to  form  a  universal 
idea  without  beginning  with  the  perception  of  the 
senses  and  without  being  accompanied  in  our  mental 
activity  by  phantasms  of  the  imagination.  Nor  do  we 
deny  that  the  common  phantasm  by  a  kind  of  analog- 
ous universality  bears  some  resemblance  to  the  corres- 
ponding universal  idea.  Nevertheless,  they  are  very 
different  in  their  real  nature. 

In  what  does  this  difference  consist? 

As  every  one  concedes,  the  propositions:  "the 
angles  of  a  triangle  are  equal  to  two  right  angles,  the 
cow  belongs  to  the  vertebrates,  man  is  mortal,"  in- 
volve universal  ideas.  For  when  pronouncing  these 
truths  we  do  not  restrict  them  to  any  particular  trian- 
gle or  cow  or  man,  but  to  all  triangles,  cows  and  men 
without  exception  and  in  the  very  same  sense.  Now, 
what  must  and  what  must  not  be  attributed  to  these 
universal  ideas,  in  as  far  as  they  are  opposed  to  the 
corresponding  common  phantasms?  To  say  nothing 
of  less  important  distinctions,  as  the  sharp  and  precise 
clearness  of  the  idea  and  the  vague  obscurity  of  the 
common  phantasm,  the  -main  difference  lies  in  the 
fact,  that  the  universal  idea  is  really  and  essentially 
universal  and  free  from,  any  definite  extension^  whilst 
the  common  phantasm,  even  when  it  is  so  "universal" 

»)  Clarke,  1.  c.,  p.  137. 


72  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

as  almost  to  vanish  from  our  imagination,  still  retains 
a  definite  extension ,  and  remains  essentially  individual. 
The  universal  concept  of  a  man  or  a  triangle  can  be 
applied  not  only  to  a  redskin  or  a  negro,  not  only  to 
this  or  that  triangle,  obtuse  or  equilateral,  but  to  all 
men  and  all  triangles  without  any  exception, 
whilst  the  phantasm  of  a  triangle  even  in  the  most 
extreme  case  can  never  be  identified  with  any  other 
triangle.  It  even  disappears  from  our  imagination,  if 
we  eliminate  its  sides  of  a  definite  length,  its  obtuse 
or  acute  angles.  But  the  universal  idea  of  a  triangle 
is  independent  of  all  this.  It  can  be  identified  with 
any  existing  or  possible  triangle,  even  if  the  latter  be 
so  large  that  its  three  vertices  rest  on  three  different 
fixed  stars,  or  so  small  that  we  can  perceive  it  only  by 
means  of  a  microscope,  if  its  sides  be  green  or  blue, 
its  angles  obtuse  or  acute.  These  are  merely  casual 
differences,  and  do  not  affect  its  nature  as  a  triangle. 
The  universal  idea  expresses  that  which  constitutes  a 
being,  denotes  its  essence,  its  nature,  whilst  the  pic- 
ture in  the  imagination  merely  represents  a  being, 
colored  in  such  and  such  a  way,  of  this  or  that  exten- 
sion. The  color  and  extension  of  things,  even  of  one 
and  the  same  class,  may  be  different;  but  the  nature  of 
things  must  be  the  same  in  all.  A  man  deprived  of  his 
essence,  of  that  which  makes  him  what  he  is,  would 
no  longer  be  a  man,  and  a  triangle  no  longer  a  trian- 
gle. Still,  we  do  not  wish  to  say  that  the  universal 
idea  of  human  nature  exists  in  the  same  way,  that  is,  as 
universal,  in  every  individual  human  being.  That  is 
the  error  of  the  ultra-realists.  Every  finite  being  that 
exists,  or  can  be  called  into  existence,  is  necessarily 


INSTINCT  AND  INTELLIGENCE.  73 

individual  and  realizes  the  universal  idea  of  that  being 
in  its  own  way.  Every  human  being  is  a  man,  but 
never  the  same  man.  My  own  individual  human  na- 
ture is  not  identical  with  the  individual  human  nature 
of  anybody  else.  But  we  do  want  to  say  that  every 
finite  essence  can  be  deprived  of  its  individuality  by  ab- 
straction; that  by  this  process  we  attain  a  universal  idea, 
the  so-called  metaphysical  essence  of  the  Scholastics, 
which  is  one  and  the  same,  and  can  be  predi- 
cated of  every  individual  being  belonging  to  that 
class.  l<The  physical  is  not  the  same,  but  perfectly 
alike  in  all;  the  metaphysical  essence  is  nothing  else 
than  the  physical  essence  inadequately  conceived  by 
us. ' '  Nor  is  this  universal  idea  a  mere  fiction  of  the 
mind.  It  is  based  on  the  perfect  likeness  of  individ- 
uals of  the  same  essence.  In  forming  it,  our  mind 
does  not  produce  but  presupposes  this  perfect  likeness 
as  something  entirely  independent  of  all  intellectual 
activity. 

For  all  men,  no  matter  what  their  stature,  color, 
and  so  forth  may  be,  are  true  men  and  have  what  we 
call  a  "human  nature";  and  all  triangles  possess,  as  a 
matter  of  fact  and  independently  of  the  mind  that 
which  makes  them  triangles.  The  only  thing  that 
the  intellect  produces  is  the  iiniversality  as  such.  For 
the  intellect  has  the  power  of  perfect  abstraction.  It 
is  capable  of  omitting  all  differences  between  the  objects 
under  consideration,  including  that  property  which 
makes  every  object  individual,  and  of  conceiving  or 
retaining  merely  what  is  truly  common  to  all  of  them. 

What,  therefore,  is  the  true  nature  of  the  univer- 
sal idea  and  the  common  phantasm? 


74  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

Both  are  acts  of  the  mind  and  as  such  they  are  in- 
dividual, just  as  any  other  existing  object  or  property. 
But,  in  as  far  as  their  objective  contents  are  concerned, 
that  is,  in  as  far  as  they  are  representations  of  objects, 
the  common  phantasm  is  and  remains  individual  and 
extended,  while  the  universal  idea  is  universal  and 
inextended,  even  though  the  object  in  its  actual  state 
of  existence  possesses  the  quality  of  extension.  For, 
as  long  as  we  do  not  eliminate  any  and  every  vestige 
of  extension,  the  representation  of  the  object  is  devoid 
of  the  character  of  universality.  True  universality 
absolutely  demands  that  even  the  last  trace  of  individual- 
ity disappears. 

What,  therefore,  is  our  answer  to  the  question :  Is  a 
sensitive  faculty  able  to  form  general  notions? 

It  must  be  negative.  For  as  one  of  our  best  psych- 
ologists puts  the  argument:  "We  are  capable  of  ap- 
prehending and  representing  to  ourselves  abstract  and 
universal  ideas.  But  such  operations  could  not  be 
states  of  a  faculty  exerted  through,  or  intrinsically  de- 
pendent on,  a  bodily  organ.  A  power  of  this  kind 
can  only  react  in  response  to  physical  impressions, 
and  can  only  form  representations  of  a  concrete  charac- 
ter, depicting  contingent  individual  facts.  But,  uni- 
versality, possibility,  logical  sequence,  general  rela- 
tions, do  not  constitute  such  a  physical  stimulus,  and 
consequently  could  not  be  apprehended  by  an  organic 
faculty.  Consequently  these  higher  mental  functions 
must  be  admitted  to  be  of  a  spiritual  character;  they 
thus  transcend  the  sphere  of  all  actions  depending  in- 
trinsically or  essentially  by  their  nature  on  a  natural 
instrument."  x) 

x)  Maher,  1.  c.,  p.  471. 


INSTINCT  AND  INTELLIGENCE.  75 

In  other  words:  A  sensuous  faculty  is  by  its  very 
nature  extended,  and  can  represent  only  extended  ob- 
jects. But  universal  ideas  as  such  are  completely  inde- 
pendent of  every  vestige  of  definite  extension.  There- 
fore^ a  sensuous  faculty  is  imable  to  form  general  ideas. 

What  is  the  necessary  conclusion? 

Perhaps  that  there  are  no  universal  ideas?  But  the 
foregoing  explanations  prove  that  this  is  absurd. 
With  logical  necessity,  therefore,  and  not  because 
"some  peculiar  bias  has  influenced  our  philosophical 
views",  we  have  to  assert  that  any  one  who  is  able  to 
form  universal  ideas  by  abstraction  must  be  endowed 
with  a  faculty  which  trancends  the  power  of  the  senses, 
with  a  faculty  capable  of  representing  inextended  ob- 
jects, and  extended  ones  in  an  inextended  manner.  In 
other  words,  the  cognition  of  universal  ideas  is  insep 
arably  connected  with  a  supersensuous •,  immaterial, 
spiritual  intellect. 

Perhaps  many  an  adversary  will  reject  this  conclu- 
sion, because  it  leads  with  inevitable  necessity  to  the 
acknowledgment  of  a  spiritual  soul  in  man,  which, 
even  in  the  eyes  of  so  eminent  a  scientist  as  Emery,  is 
a  mysterious  being,  whose  existence  man  may  recog- 
nize or  deny,  according  to  his  views  of  the  universe 
and  of  the  nature  of  man. 

But,  if  a  spiritual  faculty  is  necessary  to  form  uni- 
versal ideas,  it  is  equally  necessary  to  act  with  con- 
sciousness of  finality;  for,  as  we  have  proved,  this  con- 
sciousness implies  universal  ideas.  Again,  as  "piir- 
pose,"  supposes  consciousness  of  finality,  there  can  be 
no  action  directed  by  '  'purpose' '  without  a  spiritual 


76  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

faculty.  Herewith  we  have  proved  our  definition 
that  intelligent  activity  involves  essentially  a  perfect  con- 
sciousness of  final  tendency,  and  is  guided  by  a  purely 
spiritual  cognition  arid  appetite, 

What,  therefore,  is  the  essential  criterion  of  distinc- 
tion between  instinctive  and  intelligent  activity?  An 
intelligent  action  implies  necessarily  consciousness  of  fina- 
lity, whilst  an  instinctive  one  does  not.  Does  this  criter- 
ion postulate  an  essential  difference?  Yes,  an  instinc- 
tive action  is  of  a  sensuous,  an  intelligent  act  of  a  spiri- 
tual character. 


PART  II.     . 
ANIMALS  HAVE  NO  INTELLIGENCE. 


CHAPTER  VII. 
The  "Intelligence"  of  "The  Lower  Animals". 

I  Tis  true,  that  most  modern  naturalists,  as  was  men- 
tioned before,  deny  the  difference  in  quality 
between  the  human  mind  and  the  animal  soul  which 
is  strenuously  upheld  by  Catholic  philosophy.  They 
consider  themselves  and  their  ideas  as  a  "product  and 
a  subject  of  universal  evolution".  "Surely,"  as  Pro- 
fessor W.  M.  Wheeler  says,  when  commenting  on 
Wasmann's  views,  "the  sciences  of  comparative  phy- 
siology, anatomy  and  embryology,  not  to  mention 
paleontology,  distribution  and  taxonomy  must  have 
been  cultivated  to  little  purpose  during  the  nineteenth 
century,  if  we  are  to  rest  satisfied  with  the  scholastic 
definition  of  ratiocination  as  an  adequate  and  final 
verity.  And  surely  no  one  who  is  conversant  with 
modern  biological  science  will  accept  the  views  that 
the  power  of  abstract  ratiocinative  thought,  which  is 
absent  in  infants  and  young  children,  scarcely  deve- 
loped in  savages,  and  highly  developed  and  generally 
manifested  only  in  the  minority  of  civilized  men,  has 
miraculously  ( ! )  sprung  into  existence  in  full  panoply 
like  the  daughter  of  Jove. "  1 ) 

l)  The  American  Naturalist,  vol.     XXXV  (1901),  p.  873. 
(77) 


78  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

We  fail  to  see  how  the  results  of  the  sciences  en- 
umerated by  Prof.  Wheeler  could  ever  change  the  def- 
inition of  intelligence  developed  in  the  preceding 
pages,  since  that  definition  rests  on  totally  different 
grounds  and  belongs  to  a  sphere  which  even  a  science 
like  physiology  can  only  approach,  but  never  reach. 
The  fact  that  intelligent  actions  can  only  proceed  from 
an  inextended  spiritual  faculty  is  indeed  a  final  verity, 
which,  it  is  true,  may  find  a  much  deeper  and  more 
adequate  explanation  as  true  human  psychology  ad- 
vances, but  which  will  never  be  changed  in  the  point 
it  emphasizes. 

We  have  seen  in  the  first  part  of  this  essay  that  the 
essential  criterion  for  discriminating  instinctive  and 
intelligent  actions  from  each  other  lies  in  the  fact 
whether  or  not  the  animal  evinces  consciousness  of  the 
finality  guiding  its  actions.  This  criterion  we  shall 
apply  in  our  present  investigation,  which  proposes  to 
show  that  neither  the  lower  nor  the  higher  animals 
betray  the  slightest  vestige  of  intelligence.  "High 
animals"  are  distinguished  from  "low  animals"  by 
the  fact  that  the  bodies  of  the  latter  are  less  different- 
iated than  those  of  the  former.  Practically  the  dis- 
tinction will  coincide  with  the  division  of  the  animal 
kingdom  into  invertebrates  and  vertebrates. 

In  order  to  establish  the  proposition  that  the  lower 
animals  are  void  of  intelligence  we  propose  to  enter 
upon  a  most  remarkable  psychic  contrast  observed  in 
the  life-history  of  two  ant-species,  Polyergus  and  For- 
mica sanguinea.  The  latter  easily  holds  the  first  place 
among  all  ants  and,  in  general,  among  all  lower  ani- 
mals. This  fact  is  freely  granted  by  the  best  observ- 


THE  INTELLIGENCE  OF  '  'THE  LOWER  ANIMALS".      79 

ers  of  ants.  Some  even,  as  Sir  John  Lubbock,  main- 
tain that  in  a  certain  sense  the  Formica  sanguinea 
stands  next  to  man.  Hence,  to  substantiate  the  prop- 
osition that  the  lower  animals  are  void  of  intelligence, 
it  is  but  necessary  to  prove  that  this  famous  ant  does 
not  possess  any  higher  faculty  than  mere  animal  in- 
stinct. Another  reason,  why  we  give  preference  to 
ants  as  subjects  of  our  inquiry,  is  because  the  actions 
of  no  other  animal  have  been  so  much  misinterpreted 
for  upholding  the  doctrine  of  animal  intelligence. 

This  is  especially  true  of  the  ant-species  Polyergus, 
which  we  have  selected  as  first  example.  x ) 

It  is  a  warm  sunny  day  in  June.  In  a  colony  of 
the  Polyergus  rufescens  (Plate  III.,  Fig.  1)  feverish 
activity  is  displayed.  The  Amazons  (this  is  their 
popular  name  in  Europe),  having  spent  well  nigh  the 
whole  morning  in  preening  their  legs  and  feelers,  rally 
upon  their  battlements,  that  is  on  the  top  of  their  nest, 
and  with  great  haste  and  evident  excitement  descend 
for  a  warlike  expedition.  Within  about  50  paces  of 
their  castle  there  is  in  a  meadow  a  settlement  of  the 
Formica  rufibarbis.  Already  some  time  before  some 
roving  members  of  the  Polyergus  household  have  ac- 
cidentally hit  upon  this  formicary,  and  now  under 
their  guidance  a  goodly  array  of  about  1000  "slave- 
hunters"  may  be  seen  marching  in  an  almost  straight 
line  upon  their  destined  prey.  Having  arrived  with- 
in 10  cm.  of  the  enemy's  stronghold,  the  vanguard 
comes  to  a  stop,  giving  a  violent  signal  with  their  feel- 
ers to  the  ranks  immediately  behind  them.  With  in- 

J)  The  following  description  was  originally  published  in 
the  Scientific  American  Supplement. 


30  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

credible  rapidity  a  number  of  emissaries  hurry  through 
the  main  body  of  the  army,  and  in  less  than  30  seconds 
the  forces  are  ready  for  the  attack.  In  a  twinkling 
they  scale  the  walls  of  the  F.  rufibarbis  bulwark.  With 
indescribable  celerity  the  Amazons  fall  upon  their  en- 
emy. And  there  we  may  behold  a  twofold  spectacle. 
While  one  part  of  the  Polyergus  warriors  is  murdering 
the  defenders  of  the  hostile  nest,  the  other  and  greater 
part  is  rushing  through  every  opening  into  the  interior 
of  the  enemy's  citadel.  Some  minutes  have  passed. 
A  double  stream  of  ants  is  issuing  from  the  interior  of 
the  nest.  Both  are  loaded  down  with  cocoons,  the 
"papooses"  of  ants,  one  consisting  of  F.  rufibarbis  en- 
deavoring to  save  what  may  be  saved,  the  other  of  the 
Polyergus  troops  hastily  returning  with  their  booty. 
There  is  no  useless  shedding  of  blood.  The  crania  of 
the  F.  rufibarbis  are  trepanned  only  in  so  far  as  they 
refuse  to  yield  up  their  progeny.  Suddenly  the  scene 
is  changed.  The  F.  rufibarbis,  noticing  the  hasty 
flight  of  the  ravishers,  at  once  pursue  them  to  make 
them  give  up  their  precious  burden.  There  is  a  fierce 
pulling  and  struggling  hither  and  thither.  The  F. 
rufibarbis  plunge  their  mandibles  into  the  legs  and 
feelers  of  the  Amazons  and  cover  them  with  venomous 
ejections  from  their  abdomens.  But  only  some  of  the 
Amazons'  rearguard  are  constrained  by  superior  num- 
bers to  deliver  up  the  ravished  cocoons,  while  one  or 
the  other  of  their  warriors  remains  a  corpse  upon  the 
field.  In  about  ten  minutes  everything  is  over.  The 
scattered  F.  rufibarbis  forces  return  to  their  dwelling 
to  restore  everything,  if  possible,  to  its  pristine  state. 
The  stolen  cocoons,  however,  are  handed  over  by  the 
Polyergus  to  their  slaves,  already  present  in  the  nest, 


THE  INTELLIGENCE  OF  "THE  LOWER  ANIMALS".       81 

for  further  care  and  development,  or  for  consumption. 
They  themselves  again  squat  on  their  four  hindlegs, 
to  renew  their  comical  cleaning  operations,  which 
they  interrupt  only  to  extort  food  from  some  pass- 
ing slave.  The  young  ants,  which  are  fortunate 
enough  to  come  safely  out  of  their  cocoons,  are 
in  reality  not  treated  by  the  colony  as  slaves  (which 
in  this  case  is  a  wrong  appellation) ,  but  as  full-fledged 
citizens.  However,  it  is  their  lot,  at  least  in  the  nests 
of  the  Polyergus,  which  are  unfit  for  any  work,  to  take 
upon  themselves  the  construction  of  the  nest,  the  rear- 
ing of  the  brood,  and  the  victualizing  of  the  whole 
community.  And  this  task  they  undertake  with  mas- 
terly skill  and  rare  devotion.  Entirely  forgetful,  as  it 
were,  of  their  home  and  kindred,  they  are  absorbed 
in  caring  for  strangers.  They  are  unconcerned  even 
about  the  propagation  of  their  own  species,  they  sac- 
rifice that  for  which  animals  strive  to  the  utmost  mere- 
ly in  order  to  preserve  the  race  of  their  oppressors, 
which  would  otherwise  be  doomed  to  certain  destruc- 
tion. 

This  is  the  exterior  appearance  of  one  of  the  most 
splendid  expeditions  ever  observed  by  Huber,  Forel  or 
Wasmann,  and  certainly  the  fact  narrated  seems  to 
betray  a  high  degree  of  intelligence.  For,  first  of  all , 
by  their  warlike  expeditions  the  Amazons  seem  to 
intend  to  supply  their  household  with  new  auxiliaries. 
Moreover,  the  means  applied  for  the  purpose  are  most 
appropriate.  "Scouts"  have  explored  the  hostile  nest 
and  seem  to  lead  the  whole  army.  At  the  right  mo- 
ment the  signal  for  the  attack  is  given.  The  attack 
itself  takes  place  on  a  sudden,  with  great  celerity  and 
by  all  at  once.  Thus  the  enemy  will  be  surprised  and 


82  THE  HUMANIZING  OP  THE  BRUTE. 

the  number  of  cocoons  captured  will  be  more  consid- 
erable. No  blood  is  shed  without  purpose.  More- 
over, the  Polyergus  seem  to  distinguish  very  well  be- 
tween the  useful  cocoons  of  workers  and  the  useless 
and  harmful  ones  of  the  females  and  males.  Finally, 
the  ants  apparently  succeed  in  determining  their 
slaves  to  desist  from  the  care  of  the  preservation 
of  their  own  species,  and  to  devote  all  their  strength, 
yea,  even  their  very  life,  for  the  benefit  of  the  colony 
and  the  progeny  of  their  ravishers. 

These  few  facts,  indeed,  seem  to  throw  a  brilliant 
light  upon  the  psychic  faculties  of  the  ants;  and  though 
some  of  them  may  be  explained  by  very  simple  proc- 
esses, there  are  scarcely  any  others  in  the  life-history 
of  animals  which  present  to  us  a  more  intellectual 
appearance.  The  question  now  arises:  Must  these 
facts  in  reality  be  attributed  to  true  intelligence;  do 
they  really  involve  true  consciousness  of  finality? 
A  short  consideration  of  the  dark  side  in  the  life-his- 
tory of  these  very  same  ants  will  convince  us  that  this 
question  cannot  be  answered  in  the  affirmative  with- 
out evident  contradiction. 

As  will  be  known  to  many  of  our  readers,  the 
mandibles  of  the  Amazons  are  of  a  peculiar  construc- 
tion. They  are  not  like  those  of  other  ants  adapted 
for  many  functions  necessary  to  sustain  the  life  of  the 
individuals  and  commonly  exercised  by  those  organs 
(Plate  III.,  Figs.  2  and  3).  Hence  the  Amazons 
essentially  depend  on  the  assistance  of  their  help- 
mates in  many  of  their  actions.  This  essential  depen- 
dence goes  so  far  that  throughout  life  the  Polyergus 
are  even  nourishedby  their  slaves.  This  fact  is 


THE  INTELLIGENCE  OF  '  'THE  LOWER  ANIMALS' ' .      83 

PLATE  III 


Fig  1.— A  Polyergus  (Polyergus  bicolor  Wasm.)    (Original.) 


Fig.  2. — Head  and  Mandibles  of  a 
Formica  seen  from  Below. 
(Original.) 


Fig.  3. — Head  and  Mandibles  of  a 
Polyergus  seen  from  Below. 
(Original.) 


Fig  4. — Lower  Lip  of  a  Formica 
(labium).  (Wasemann.)  (a  = 
labial  palpi  ;  b  =  ligula;  c  = 
paraglossze.) 


Pig.  5.— Lower  Lip  of  a  Polyergus- 

(Wasmann.)     a  ==  labia  1  palpi  I 
=  ligula;    c  =    paraglossse.) 


THE  INTELLIGENCE  OF  " THE  LOWER  ANIMALS " .      85 

sufficiently  established  by  the  observations  of  Huber, 
I^espeo,  Forel,  Adlerz,  Wasmann,  etc. 

The  writer,  too,  had,  occasion  to  verify  the  same 
with  regard  to  Polyergus  bicolor  Wasm. ,  a  newly  dis- 
covered American  Amazon.  The  process  of  feeding 
takes  place  in  the  following  manner.  The  hungry 
Polyergus  first  violently  buffets  and  strokes  with  feel- 
ers and  forelegs  the  head  of  a  passing  slave.  If  the 
slave  has  sufficient  food  in  its  little  crop,  it  causes  a 
drop  of  the  prepared  liquid  to  appear  on  its  lower  lip, 
where  it  is  licked  off  by  the  Amazon.  Now  it  is  cer- 
tainly a  very  rare  case  that  an  animal  so  much  de- 
pends on  others  that  it  must  even  be  fed  by  them  dur- 
ing its  whole  existence.  And  thus  the  two  interesting 
questions  present  themselves:  First,  what  will  happen 
to  the  Polyergus  if  deprived  of  their  slaves?  And 
secondly,  are  they  at  all  able  to  obtain  food  independ- 
ently of  any  exterior  aid?  As  to  the  second  question, 
Wasmann  sums  up  the  results  of  a  minute  examina- 
tion of  the  Amazon's  mouth -parts  in  the  following 
statements:  1.  By  the  construction  of  their  mouth- 
parts,  and  especially  by  the  shortness  of  their  palpi, 
the  Amazons  show,  indeed,  that  they  are  less  adapted 
for  independent  feeding  than  other  ants  related  to 
them  (Figs.  4  and  5).  2.  There  is,  however,  no  or- 
ganic impossibility  in  the  way  of  their  independent 
nutrition.  For  other  ants  with  organs  not  less  imper- 
fect feed  themselves  without  being  assisted  by  others. 
3.  The  structure  of  the  so-called  paraglossae  seems 
even  to  indicate  that  the  Polyergus  are  able  to  obtain 
food  in  an  extraordinary  manner  (Figs.  4  and  5).  Yet 
these  inferences  from  the  construction  of  the  mouth- 


86  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

parts  of  the  Polyergus  would  in  themselves  not  be 
sufficiently  warranted,  unless  actual  experiment  had 
corroborated  them.  Examining  the  mandibles  of  the 
Polyergus,  we  find  that  on  the  interior  side  they  have 
a  slight  excavation  widening  toward  the  head  (Fig. 
1).  But  as  the  Amazons  are  endowed  with  great  pred- 
atory instinct,  they  take  delight  in  exercising  their 
mandibles  upon  their  foes;  and  if  then  these  organs 
happen  to  be  inserted  into  the  body  of  ants  or  their 
cocoons,  the  channels  contained  in  them  convey  the 
liquid  to  the  lower  parts  of  the  mouth.  Now  Was- 
mann  with  sufficient  frequency  observed  the  following 
fact:  While  the  mandibles  of  a  Polyergus,  having 
pierced  the  body  of  an  enemy,  were  resting  quietly  in 
the  same  position,  their  palpi  and  lower  lips  were 
moving  in  regular  intervals  toward  the  inside,  this 
movement  lasting  from  three  to  five  minutes  But 
precisely  this  motion  of  the  palpi  and  lip  constitute 
the  eating  operation  of  ants.  Moreover,  Adlerz,  Was- 
mann  and  the  writer  himself  have  noticed  how  in  ob- 
servation nests  Polyergus  accidentally  coming  into 
contact  with  the  glass  panes  of  the  walls  licked  off  the 
drops  of  precipitation  found  upon  them.  From  this  it 
follows  that  the  Polyergus  are  actually  capable  of  in- 
dependent nutrition.  What  should  we,  therefore,  na- 
turally expect  of  them,  if  they  are  robbed  of  their 
slaves?  Most  assuredly  that  impelled  by  hunger  they 
would  make  use  of  their  power  of  eating  and  would 
make  an  independent  effort  to  partake  of  the  food 
placed  before  them.  But  what  are  the  actual  facts? 
The  result  of  numberless  experiments  is  the  following: 
Although  the  Polyergus  are  able  to  eat  and  accident- 


THE  INTELLIGENCE  OF  '  'THE  LOWER  ANIMALS".       87 

ally  do  eat  now  and  then,  they  must  absolutely  be  fed 
by  their  slaves,  if  they  are  to  remain  alive.  You  may 
prepare  for  them  the  most  pleasant  dwelling  and  the 
most  exquisite  nourishment;  if  you  neglect  to  provide 
them  with  slaves,  they  are  doomed.  Their  desire  for 
nourishment  impels  them  only  to  seek  it  from  their 
slaves,  but  never  to  make  an  attempt  at  independent 
nutrition.  Therefore,  this  ant  apparently  so  intelli- 
gent in  its  warlike  operations,  is  so  abnormally  stupid 
and  helpless  in  private  life,  as  not  to  be  able  to  estab- 
lish the  simple  relation  between  the  promptings  of  ap- 
petite and  independent  nutrition,  and  prefers  death  to 
making  use  of  its  faculty  of  eating.  But  a  being  that 
is  capable  of  eating  and  from  experience  knows  how 
to  eat,  yet  even  in  the  greatest  necessities  with  unex- 
ceptional regularity,  prefers  to  die  than  to  eat 
independently,  is  a  rather  poor  specimen  of  ant 
intelligence.  There  can  be  no  question  here  of 
some  error  of  judgment,  as  may  occur  in  man  en- 
dowed with  intelligence.  Real  error  cannot  be  a  nor- 
mal occurence;  it  is  never  found  in  all  individuals  of 
the  same  species;  it  cannot  be  committed,  unless  there 
is  at  least  some  appearance  of  truth  and  some  influence 
of  passion  or  prejudice.  Regarding  the  actions  in 
question,  however,  all  the  circumstances  point  not  to 
an  accidental  error,  but  to  an  entire  absence  of  intelli- 
gence. For  in  the  first  place,  these  actions  are  entire- 
ly useless  for  the  individuals  performing  them.  Sec- 
ondly, they  occur  with  all  the  individuals  so  far 
observed  both  in  Europe  and  in  America.  Finally, 
there  can  be  no  question  of  the  influence  of  their  will 
under  the  stress  of  some  passion  or  predilection.  For 


88  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

every  natural  desire  would  prompt  them  to  do  the  op- 
posite. Thus  we  are  forced  by  inexorable  facts  to 
deny  to  the  great  warrior  ant,  the  much  lauded  Ama- 
zon, the  faculty  of  acting  with  the  consciousness  of 
final  purpose  and  to  assign  her  a  place  in  the  realms 
of  mere  animal  instinct. 

The  second  psychic  contrast,  which  strongly  con- 
roborates  the  conclusion  suggested  by  the  first,  is  taken 
from  the  life-history  of  Formica  sanguinea.  This  ant, 
it  is  true,  does  not  exhibit  the  brilliant  intrepidity  char- 
acterizing the  warlike  expeditions  of  the  Polyergus. 
According  to  Forel  sixty  amazons  can  put  to  flight 
thousands  of  the  Formica  sanguinea.  Again  their 
warlike  tactics  do  not  present  the  same  certainty  and 
unity,  at  least  not  if  there  is  question  of  more  popu- 
lous slave-nests.  Finally  the  number  of  expeditions, 
in  the  case  of  the  Polyergus  about  44  in  33  days  with 
a  result  of  40,000  cocoons,  is  in  the  case  of  the  Formica 
sanguinea  comparatively  insignificant.  But  in  spite  of 
these  facts,  which  are  partially  due  to  the  independence 
of  the  Fornica  sanguinea  from  its  auxiliaries,  some 
features  in  the  expedition  of  this  ant  exteriorly  seem 
to  indicate  a  superiority  in  psychic  endowments.  We 
mention  only  a  single  instance.  Whilst  Polyergus 
makes  its  attack  in  serried  ranks  and  with  all  the  forces 
actually  engaged  in  the  expedition,  Formica  sanguinea 
uses  only  a  part  of  its  troops  for  purposes  of  assault. 
The  rest,  as  if  intending  to  blockade  the  hostile  formi- 
cary, distribute  themselves  in  squadrons  around  it. 
If,  then,  the  inhabitants  of  the  nest  try  to  save  their 
young  by  flight,  they  are  at  once  pursued  and  cap- 
tured by  the  outlying  posts.  It  is  evident  that  this 


THE  INTELLIGENCE  OF  '  'THE  LOWER  ANIMALS".      89 

procedure  is  admirably  adapted  to  secure  the  desired 
cocoons.  For  the  nest  of  Formica  fusca,  the  princi- 
pal auxiliary  of  Formica  sanguinea,  is  in  most  cases 
not  very  large,  and  its  inhabitants  are  cowards,  at 
least  if  alone.  Thus  it  happens  that  a  few  of  the 
Formica  sanguinea  are  sufficient  to  bring  about  a 
universal  flight.  If,  consequently,  Formica  sanguinea 
would  not  divide  its  army,  but  make  its  attack  with 
all  the  forces,  this  kind  of  action  would  not  only 
waste  the  strength  of  the  aggressive  power,  but  also 
most  probably  result  in  little  success.  For,  ere  the 
Formica  sanguinea  could  have  succeeded  in  reaching 
the  interior  of  the  hostile  nest,  the  majority  of  the 
fleet-footed  Formica  fusca  would  most  probably  have 
left  it. 

But,  however  imposing  the  wonderful  array  of  the 
apparently  intelligent  actions  of  the  Formica  sanguinea 
may  be,  it  can  be  easily  shown  that  there  is  no  more 
intelligence  in  them  than  in  Polyergus.  For  the  pur- 
pose of  proving  this  statement  we  intend  to  refer  to 
the  relation  existing  between  the  Formica  sanguinea 
and  one  of  its  lavorites,  tJie  beetle  "Lomechusa  strum- 
osa."  This  most  interesting  relation  was  discovered 
and  described  by  Eric  Wasmann,  S.J. ,  x)  and  has  of 
late  been  verified  with  reference  to  the  respective  rep- 

*)  Of  the  numerous  publications  of  E.  Wasmann,  S.J.,  on 
this  subject,  we  mention  especially  "Vergleichende  Studien 
ueber  das  Seelenleben  der  Ameisen  und  der  hoeheren  Tiere" 
(Herder),  2d  ed.,  1900.  Moreover,  "Die  Ergatogynen  Formen 
bei  den  Ameisen  und  ihre  Erklaerung,"  Biologisches  Cen- 
tralbl.,  XV.,  pp.  606-646,  and  "Neue  Bestaetigungen  der  Lome- 
chusa-Pseudogynentheorie,"  Verhandlungen  der  Deutschen 
Zoologischen  Gesellschaft,  1902,  pp.  98-108,  etc. 


90  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

resentatives  of  the  two  European  species  in  America. 
L,et  us  see  in  what  this  relation  consists.  It  is  the 
custom  of  the  Formica  sanguinea  not  only  to  adopt 
related  species  of  ants  as  their  auxiliaries,  but  also  to 
receive  a  number  of  other  insects,  notably  the  L,ome- 
chusa  strumosa,  as  genuine  guests  into  their  house- 
hold. This  hospitable  relation  between  ant  and  beetle 
is  based  on  various  reasons.  Unable  to  raise  its  own 
brood,  the  Lomechusa  has  the  instinctive  desire  to 
have  itself  and  its  young  fed  by  the  Formica  san- 
guiaea.  On  the  part  of  the  Formica  sanguinea  the 
relation  to  its  guest  is  based  in  part  on  the  circum- 
stance that  its  maternal  instinct  is  aroused  by  the 
sight  of  the  helpless  beings  before  it.  Then,  by  ac- 
tive and  passive  mimicry,  the  L,omechusae  imitate  the 
attitudes  and  behavior  of  their  hosts  and  furnish  them 
some  pleasurable  sensations  for  their  gustatory  and 
olfactory  organs.  Besides,  in  order  to  understand  the 
facts  to  be  explained  presently,  we  must  remember 
that  there  are  four  distinct  periods  in  the  life-history 
of  beetles  and  ants.  Not  unlike  our  birds,  the  young 
offspring  passes  the  first  days  of  its  short-lived  existence 
in  the  dark  and  narrow  enclosure  of  the  egg.  Scarcely 
has  the  baby-beetle  escaped  from  its  precious  en- 
closure, when  it  starts  upon  the  second  most  precarious 
period  of  its  life.  A  tiny  mass  of  pulp,  the  helpless 
creature,  now  called  larva,  lies  in  the  nest  of  the  ants. 
Totally  dependent  on  their  "loving  care",  it  ever  and 
again  opens  its  mouth,  to  be  fed  by  its  "kind"  host. 
After  its  bodily  size  has  assumed  the  proper  propor- 
tions, the  larva  is  carried  by  the  ants  to  a  suitable 
place  and  covered  with  earth.  In  its  temporary 


THE  INTELLIGENCE  OF  '  'THE  LOWER  ANIMALS".      91 

grave,  however,  it  does  not  return  to  dust,  but  having 
spun  a  dense  web  or  cocoon  around  itself,  it  soon 
changes  its  bulky  form  into  the  so-called  pupa,  indi- 
cating in  more  or  less  distinct  outlines  the  form  and 
structure  of  the  future  beetle.  Finally,  the  periods  of 
development  come  to  an  end.  The  pupa  tries  to  ex- 
tricate itself  from  the  narrow  confinement  of  its  little 
house  and  makes  its  appearance  as  a  lively  beetle, 
somewhat  smaller  than  represented  in  the  accompany- 
ing illustration  (Plate  IV,  Fig.  1). 

Now,  in  supporting  its  guest,  the  Formica  san- 
guinea,  as  a  rule,  commits  two  blunders  betraying  such 
a  profound  stupidity  as  to  furnish  us  very  clear 
proof  that  in  those  ants  not  a  trace  of  consciousness 
of  final  tendency  can  be  found. 

For,  in  the  first  place,  through  the  hospitality  ac- 
corded to  the  I,omechusa,  the  Formica  sanguinea 
bring  about  the  ruin  of  their  colony  and  the  gradual  ex- 
tinction of  their  species.  This  is  done  in  a  twofold 
way. 

(1)  There  is  perhaps  no  animal  which  cares  so 
much  for  its  young  as  does  the  ant.  For  no  sooner 
is  the  nest  attacked  than  its  inhabitants  before  all  else 
hurry  off  with  their  tender  young  to  a  place  of  secur- 
ity. And  not  unfrequently  they  suffer  themselves  to 
be  deprived  of  head  and  limb  rather  than  deliver  up 
the  larvae  to  the  enemy.  Even  if  placed  in  a  vial 
filled  with  alcohol,  they  may  often  be  found  still  hold- 
ing the  dead  larvae  between  their  mandibles.  And 
yet,  what  a  strange  spectacle  do  we  behold!  The 
ants  which  were  wont  to  defend  their  young  with  so 
much  enthusiasm  and  bravery  have  undergone  a  com- 


92  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

plete  change.  Ever  since  that  strange  guest  entered 
the  nest  and  deposited  its  eggs,  all  the  care  of  the 
ants  is  lavished  upon  the  brood  of  the  intruder,  which 
manifests  an  almost  fabulous  appetite  and  grows  with 
great  rapidity.  To  satisfy  the  hunger  of  their  "be- 
loved" guests,  the  ants  even  allow  them  freely  to  de- 
vour their  own  eggs  and  larvae,  otherwise  so  precious 
to  them;  yea  to  hasten  the  work  of  destruction,  they 
themselves  carry  the  larvae  of  the  L,omechusae  to  the 
places  where  the  eggs  and  the  larvae  of  the  ants  are 
stored  up. 

Whence  this  strange  phenomenon?  Year  after 
year  passes  by.  The  conditions  of  the  flourishing 
colony  become  more  and  more  threatening.  But  the 
"most  intellectual"  ant  is  unable  to  see  that  its  action 
must  necessarily  result  in  the  final  ruin  of  the  ant- 
colony  and  species,  and  this  the  more  so  since  the 
beetles  are  quite  numerous  and  their  appetite  most 
voracious. 

(2)  Nor  is  this  all.  To  the  rearing  of  the  L,ome- 
chusa  by  the  Formica  sanguinea  it  is  also  due  that  in 
the  colonies  of  the  latter  an  abnormal  form  of  ants  is 
produced,  which  in  the  course  of  time  must  neces- 
sarily do  additional  damage  to  the  colonies  and  species 
of  the  Formica  sanguinea.  These  abnormal  forms  are 
called  "ergatogynes,"  a  word  which  according  to  its 
Greek  origin  (  tpyAfriuu  =to  work,  yvirf=  female;  part- 
ly worker;  partly  female)  fitly  characterizes  them. 
Wasmann  distinguishes  six  different  forms,  the  most 
important  of  which  are  the  so-called  pseudogynes 
(t^evSijs  =  false)  (Figs.  2-4).  These  animals  are  evi- 
dently ruined  existences.  Unable,  either  to  lay  eggs 


THE  INTELLIGENCE  OF  '  'THE  LOWER  ANIMALS" .       93 

PLATE  IV 


Fig. 


EXPLANATION  OF  PLATE  IV. 

Fig.  I.— Xenodusa  cava  Lee.  (original).  Fig.  2.— Formica  sanguined 
subsp.  rubicunda,  Em.  a  —  female  ;  b  —  pseudogyne  ;  c  —  normal  worker 
(original) .  Fig.  3.— Thorax  of  a  normal  worker  of  F.  rubicunda  (original) . 
Fig,  4  .--Thorax  of  a  treudogyne  of  F  rubicunda  (original) . 


THE  INTELLIGENCE  OF  '  'THE  LOWER  ANIMALS".      95 

or  to  discharge  the  functions  of  workers,  they  are  use- 
less members  of  the  ant  community  and  must  finally 
effect  a  degeneration  of  the  entire  species  of  the  Formica 
sanguinea.  Now  Wasmann  has  shown  by  a  great  num- 
ber of  facts,  that  the  existence  of  these  pseudogynes 
must  be  ascribed  to  the  rearing  of  the  guest  Lome- 
chusa.  l )  As  regards  the  explanation  of  this  pheno- 
menon nothing  certain  has  as  yet  been  ascertained. 
Wasmann  is  of  the  opinion,  as  we  have  stated  else- 
where, that  the  repeated  rearing  of  the  beetle  causes 
a  gradual  change  in  the  brooding  instincts  of  the  ants, 
so  that  the  pseudogynes  are  but  a  developmental  stage 
of  such  larvae  as  were  originally  destined  to  become 
females,  but  were  in  the  course  of  their  later  develop- 
ment transformed  into  workers.  Be  this  as  it  may,  the 
fact  that  these  encumbrances  on  the  commonwealth 
come  into  existence  and  multiply  with  such  rapidity, 
is  the  fault  of  the  Formica  sanguinea  itself.  We  should 
expect,  therefore,  that  at  least  this  circumstance  would 
rouse  the  attention  of  the  ants  and  make  them  realize 
the  deplorable  condition  of  their  colony.  But  no! 
Instead  of  murdering  their  hostile  guests  one  by  one, 
they  continue  to  give  them  their  best  attention,  to 
sacrifice  for  their  sake  hundreds  of  their  own  offspring 
and  to  make  out  of  the  rest  degenerated  creatures, — 
good  for  nothing.  And  not  one  of  the  numerous  in- 
habitants of  the  various  colonies  becomes  aware  of  these 

1 )  How  far  the  very  same  may  be  proved  for  the  corres- 
ponding American  species  we  have  shortly  explained  in  our 
paper  on  "Formica  sanguinea,  subsp.  rubicunda,  Em.  and 
Xenodusa  cava  Lee,  etc.,"  Entomological  News,  December, 
1904. 


98  THE  HUMANIZING  OP  THE  BRUTE. 

most  senseless  and  self-ruining  actions.  Is  not  this  a 
clear  indication,  that  there  cannot  be  any  trace  of  true 
consciousness  of  finality  in  them?  Or,  could  we  im- 
agine an  entire  class  of  beings  endowed  with  intellect 
taking  delight  in  overcoming  the  strongest  impulse  of 
nature  in  spite  of  innumerable  and  most  disastrous 
losses?  But  this  is  only  the  first  stupid  action  of  the 
Formica  sanguinea.  The  second  is  no  less  flagrant, 
and  when  combined  with  the  first  leaves  no  doubt 
whatever  as  to  the  total  absence  of  an  intellectual  faculty 
in  ants. 

The  second  blunder  committed  by  the  Formica  san- 
guinea in  the  rearing  of  their  guests  consists  in  this 
that,  notwithstanding  their  excessive  tenderness  to- 
wards the  I^omechusa ,  the  Formica  sanguinea  are  con- 
tinually active  in  exterminating  not  only  their  own 
brood,  but  also  the  brood  of  their  guests.  For,  the 
larvae  of  beetles  require  a  treatment  totally  different 
from  that  needed  by  the  ant  larvae.  Scarcely  have  the 
latter,  toward  the  close  of  their  larval  stage,  been  em- 
bedded in  the  earth,  when  they  envelop  themselves  in 
a  close  and  firm  cocoon.  There  is,  consequently,  no 
difficulty  in  their  being  soon  after  extracted  again 
from  the  earth  and  carried  about  at  will  by  their  fel- 
lows. But  this  stereotype  procedure  is  entirely  unsuit  • 
able  for  the  young  L,omechusa.  For  these  spin  only 
a  thin  silken  cocoon,  requiring  exceedingly  gentle 
handling  and  sure  to  tear  whilst  being  extracted  from 
the  earth.  Hence,  to  drag  the  cocoons  to  the  surface 
before  the  pupae  are  completely  formed,  is  evidently 
out  of  place.  And  yet,  despite  their  strong  affection  for 
their  guests,  and  despite  all  possible  experience,  the  For- 


THE  INTELLIGENCE  OF  "  THE  LOWER  ANIMALS " .       97 

mica  sanguinea  year  after  year  fall  into  the  same  sense- 
less "error"  and  can  neither  see  nor  learn ,  that  their 
guests  require  a  different  breeding  from  that  of  their 
own  offspring.  True,  after  having  torn  the  cocoons 
of  their  darlings,  they  carefully  replace  them  in  the 
earth.  But  is  it  perhaps  to  grant  them  now  the  neces- 
sary rest  for  transformation?  On  the  contrary!  The 
same  process  is  repeated,  until  the  larvae  wither  and 
die.  But  if  through  the  carelessness  of  their  hosts 
some  larvae  succeed  in  reaching  their  pupal  stage, 
even  then  they  are  often  brought  to  the  surface,  to  be 
eaten  up  by  their  anxious  nurses  in  an  excess  of  affec- 
tion! 

In  the  first  place,  then,  the  Formica  sanguinea 
are  so  foolish  as  to  lavish  their  care  upon  the  I/ome- 
chusa  with  the  result  that  their  own  brood  is  dis- 
troyed  and  their  species  degenerated.  Secondly ,  they 
refuse  to  give  to  their  darlings  the  necessary  time  and 
rest  for  their  development,  exterminate  them  by  an 
inappropriate  treatment  and  finally  devour  them  in 
their  pupal  stage. 

But  these  two  facts  present  many  and  insoluble  diffi- 
culties in  the  way  of  ascribing  to  the  ants  the  faculty 
of  recognizing  the  appropriateness  or  inappropriate- 
ness  of  their  actions.  For,  no  matter  from  what  point 
of  view  we  consider  the  case,  we  cannot  help  but  find 
an  unfailing  and  evident  contradiction.  If  one  should 
say  that  the  Formica  sanguinea  lavish  such  tender- 
ness upon  their  guests,  because  the  latter  afford  them 
some  sense-gratification,  we  ask:  If  this  be  the  case, 
why  do  they  exterminate  and  devour  the  young  Lome- 
ohusae  and  thus  frustrate  the  accomplishment  of  such 


98  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

a  purpose?  But  if  it  be  rejoined  that  the  Formica 
sanguinea  exterminate  the  I^omechusa  because  of  the 
damage  inflicted,  we  ask:  Why  then  do  the  Formicae 
sanguineae  bestow  such  care  upon  their  guests,  as  to 
neglect  and  sacrifice  their  own  colony,  their  offspring 
and  their  species? 

Thus  the  life-history  of  the  Formica  sanguinea, 
"the  most  intellectual  ant",  affords  an  example  of  how 
from  a  more  universal  contemplation  of  ant-life,  we  are 
necessarily  led  to  adopt  conclusions  quite  different 
from  those  reached  by  certain  "pseudo-psychologists" 
of  our  day.  Of  course,  it  is  still  a  mystery,  in  what 
manner  the  single  actions  proceed  from  instinct.  For 
on  this  point  the  analogy  between  animal  and  man, 
from  which  we  must  always  proceed,  becomes  more 
remote  the  further  we  "recede  through  the  animal- 
kingdom  downwards  from  man. ' '  Still  the  fact  re- 
mains, that  the  faculty  by  which  the  activity  of  ants 
is  to  be  explained  is  not  intelligence,  but  instinct,  and 
on  this  very  point  analogy  retains  its  full  force.  But 
if  evident  contradictions  are  to  be  avoided,  this  in- 
stinct is  not  to  be  conceived  as  the  power  of  mere 
automatic  reaction,  but  rather  as  a  faculty  guided  by 
sensuous  cognition  and  modifiable  within  the  limits  of 
this  cognition  by  external  experience. 
I  The  high  degree  of  objective  finality  which  is 
manifest  in  innumerable  actions  of  the  Formica  san- 
guinea does  not  proceed  as  such  from  the  ant  itself, 
but  from  God's  eternal  Wisdom.  That  Wisdom,  too, 
can  alone  account  for  the  double  play  of  stupidity 
which  we  have  explained  above.  For,  as  Wasmann 
profoundly  remarks:  "That  supreme  Wisdom  which 


THE  INTELLIGENCE  OF  "THE  LOWER  ANIMALS".       99 

has  made  use  of  the  senseless  'love'  of  the  Formica 
sanguinea  towards  the  Lomechusae  and  their  larvae 
to  keep  the  propagation  of  the  ants  within  due  limits, 
has  made  use  of  the  same  senseless  'love'  of  the  ants 
to  prevent  the  excessive  multiplication  of  the  beetle. 
Such  are  the  mild  and  yet  powerful  measures,  by 
which  a  divine  Wisdom  is  able  to  preserve  the 
equilibrium  in  nature,  animal  intelligence  and  ani- 
mal-morality standing  before  such  phenomena  in 
impotent  perplexity. ' ' 


CHAPTER  VIII. 
The  "Intelligence"  of  "The  Higher  Animals". 

We  now  pass  over  to  some  striking  proofs  in  sup- 
port of  the  fact  that  the  proposition  which  we  have 
defended  with  reference  to  the  "most  intellectual"  of 
the  lower  animals  applies  equally  well  to  the  "most 
intellectual"  individuals  of  the  so-called  higher  ani- 
mals. Our  observations  are  based  principally  on  some 
of  the  clever  experiments  which  Prof.  Thorndike  and 
others  made  with  dogs,  cats,  and  monkeys  under  the 
most  favorable  circumstances.  We  could,  of  course, 
adduce  similar  instances  against  the  intelligence  of 
the  higher  animals,  as  we  have  explained  in  the 
proceeding  chapter.  We  could  remind  our  readers  of 
that  wonderful  dog  which,  being  deprived 'of  her 
young,  lavished  her  maternal  ministrations  on  a  pair 
of  old  slippers;  or  of  those  loving  apes  which  adopt 
other  animals,  defend  and  caress  them  and  clean  them 
of  their  fleas,  but  let  them  die  the  death  of  starvation. 
Our  proof  against  the  intelligence  of  animals  would 
be  even  more  cogent  than  the  one  furnished  by  Mr. 
Martin,  the  able  editor  of  a  voluminous  work  on 
"Natural  History",  in  favor  of  animal  intelligence. 
Says  the  worthy  Darwinist:  "When  visiting  the 
zoological  garden  in  Berlin  I  perceived  how  the 
beginnings  of  a  human  smile  really  played  on  the 
(100) 


THE  INTELLIGENCE  OF  THE  ' '  HIGHER  ANIMALS. ' '    101 

almost  humanlike  visage  of  the  Chimpanzee."  *) 
But  we  prefer  to  make  use  of  the  strictly  scientific 
experi ments  of  Prof .  Thorndike,  firstly,  because  they  are 
very  simple  and  entirely  free  from  any  subjective  ele- 
ment; secondly,  because  they  admit  of  no  doubt  what- 
ever as  to  the  reality  of  the  facts  as  well  us  to  their 
interpretation. 

For  many  reasons  Prof.  Thorndike  finds  fault  with 
most  of  the  modern  books  on  animal  intelligence. 
These  books,  he  says,  do  not  give  us  a  psychology •,  but 
rather  a  eulogy  of  animals.  They  have  all  been  about 
animal  intelligence,  never  about  animal  stupidity. 
Moreover,  according  to  him,  the  facts  have  generally 
been  derived  from  anecdotes  which  give  really  the  ab- 
normal or  supernormal  psychology  of  animals.  Fin- 
ally, even  with  good  observers  often  only  a  single  case 
is  studied,  the  conditions  of  the  case  are  not  perfectly 
regulated,  and  the  previous  history  of  the  animal  in 
question  is  not  known.  Hence  there  is  no  sufficient 
reason  for  generalization,  nor  can  the  influence  of 
previous  experiences  be  estimated.  All  these  various 
faults  Thorndike  wishes  to  avoid,  and  in  our  opinion 
he  has  succeeded  admirably. 

»)  "Illustrierte  Naturgeschichte  der  Tiere,"  Leipzig,  1882, 
p.  11.  It  is,  of  course,  evident  at  what  Mr.  Chimpanzee  really 
smiled!  Many  authors  like  Martin  maintain  that  monkeys 
use  sticks  and  stones  as  weapons  and  give  similar  evidence  of 
intelligence.  This  is  not  so.  No  less  an  authority  than  the 
editor  of  the  third  edition  of  Brehm's  "Tierleben,"  Mr.  Pech- 
nel-Iyoesche,  who  has  made  most  careful  observation  to  this 
effect  in  the  southwestern  part  of  Africa  assures  us  that,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  monkeys  "never  do  such  a  thing".  Animals 
do  not  understand  the  use  of  tools. 


102  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 


us  see.  The  following  is  the  ingenious  method 
of  experimentation  he  adopted.  He  took  a  good  num- 
ber of  dogs,  cats,  and  chicks,  and  having  deprived 
them  of  food  for  some  time,  put  them  in  enclosures 
from  which  they  could  escape  by  some  simple  act, 
such  as  pulling  at  the  loop  of  a  cord,  pressing  a  lever, 
or  stepping  on  a  platform.  A  model  of  a  box  used  in 
the  experiments  is  given  in  the  accompanying  draw- 
ing (Plate  V).  Food  was  left  outside  in  sight  of  the 
animal.  The  animal  \  then,  had  to  form  in  each  case 
some  few  simple  associations  between  the  representation 
of  the  interior  of  the  box  and  the  various  movements 
which  would  enable  it  to  satisfy  its  hunger.  The  ob- 
server made  sure  that  the  animal  was  free  from  his 
influence  and  had  never  been  subjected  to  the  same  or 
a  similar  experiment.  Moreover,  the  animals  were 
healthy,  the  main  data  of  their  life-history  were  known, 
and  they  all  were  in  the  same  state  of  absolute  hunger 
when  subjected  to  the  experiment. 

Now,  what  are  the  results  of  Thorndike's  experi- 
ments? As  far  as  they  pertain  to  the  present  subject, 
they  prove,  in  the  first  place,  that  dogs  and  cats  are  un- 
able of  themselves  to  form  associations  which  imply  the 
understanding  of  the  finality  of  actions.  For  if  they 
succeeded  in  opening  the  door  of  their  cage,  they  suc- 
ceeded BY  ACCIDENT,  not  by  intellectual  inference. 

L,et  us  give  one  typical  example.  The  successes 
and  failures  of  two  cats,  No.  1  and  No.  6,  are  ex- 
pressed in  the  following  table:  i) 

.')  1.  c.,  p.  45. 


THE  INTELLIGENCE  OFT  HE  "HIGHER  ANIMALS' 

PLATE  V. 


103 


THE  INTELLIGENCE  OF  THE  ' ' HIGHER  ANIMALS' ' .    105 


13.00  Failed. 

9.30  Succeeded. 

1.40 

.50 

15.00 

6.00  Failed. 

14.00  Succeeded. 
20.00  Failed. 
4.30  Succeeded. 
20.00  Failed. 
20.00 
15.00 

60.00 


No.  1.     13.00  Failed.  No.  6.     17.50  Succeeded. 

3.30 
9.00 
2.10 
1.45 
1.55 
13.00 

5.00 

2.30 
15.00 
10.00  Failed. 

5.00  Succeeded. 
15.00  Failed. 

10.00 
10.00         " 

The  figures  in  the  columns  represent  the  time  (in 
minutes  and  seconds)  the  animal  was  in  the  box  be- 
fore being  taken  out  if  it  failed  to  escape.  Double 
lines  represent  an  interval  of  24  hours. 

"Surely",  Mr.  Thorndike  says,  "if  one  and  six 
had  possessed  any  power  of  inference  they  would  not 
have  failed  to  get  out  after  having  done  so  several 
times.  Yet  they  did.  If  they  had  even  once,  much 
less  if  they  had  six  or  eight  times,  inferred  what  was 
to  be  done,  they  would  have  made  the  inference  the 
seventh  or  ninth  time.  And  if  there  were  in  these 
animals  any  power  of  inference,  however  rudimentary, 
however  sporadic,  however  dim,  there  should  have 
appeared  among  the  multitude  some  cases  where  an 
animal  seeing  through  the  situation ,  knows  the  proper 
act,  does  it  and  from  then  on  does  it  immediately  upon 
being  confronted  with  the  situation  .  .  .  Now  the 


106  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

scores  of  cases  recorded  show  no  such  phenomenon.  The 
cat  does  not  look  over  the  situation,  much  less  think 
it  over,  and  then  decide  what  to  do.  It  bursts  out  at 
once  into  the  activities  which  instinct  and  experience  have 
settled  on  as  suitable  reactions  to  the  situation,  'confine- 
ment when  hungry  with  food  outside. '  "  1 ) 

The  second  fact  which  is  brought  to  undeniable 
evidence  by  Mr.  Thorndike's  experiments  is  the  fol- 
lowing: Animals  are  incapable  of  learning  by  imita- 
tion such  associations  as  would  imply  on  their  part  the 
understanding  of  the  finality  of  actions.  Of  the  many 
experiments  which  Prof.  Thorndike  describes  we 
mention  only  one  or  the  other. 

Eight  chicks  were  successively  put  in  a  box,  where 
they  were  left  alone  from  sixty  to  eighty  seconds. 
Then  another  chick  which  knew  how  to  get  out  was 
introduced  with  each  of  them  into  the  box,  and  upon 
its  performing  the  act  both  were  allowed  to  escape. 
No  cases,  as  Thorndike  expressly  states,  were  counted 
unless  the  imitator  clearly  saw  the  other  do  the  thing. 
Besides,  it  was  evident,  that  the  imitators  wanted  to 
get  out  when  left  alone.  The  result  of  the  numerous 
experiments  is  as  follows:  Chick  No.  84  saw  its  com- 
panion escape  129  times,  but  failed  completely  to  imi- 
tate it.  Similarly  chick  No.  85  failed  after  30  trials, 
chick  No.  86  after  44  trials,  No.  87  after  26,  No.  80 
after  54  trials,  etc. 

Only  one,  No.  82,  performed  the  act:  but  this  was 
accidental.  Thorndike  says:  "I  have  no  hesitation 
in  declaring  82's  act  in  stepping  on  the  platform  the 

!)  I.e.,  p.  45. 


THE  INTELLIGENCE  OF  THE  "  HIGHER  ANIMALS " .    107 

result  of  mere  accident  and  am  sure  that  anyone  who 
had  watched  the  experiments  would  agree. "  l ) 

In  the  case  of  cats  the  experiment  was  so  arranged 
that  through  a  screen  the  cat  which  was  to  imitate 
another  one  could  see  its  guide  pull  the  string,  go  out 
through  the  door  thus  opened  and  eat  the  food  out- 
side. The  result  was  the  same,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
chicks.  There  was  not  the  slightest  difference  be- 
tween their  behavior  and  that  of  those  who  were  put 
into  the  same  position  without  ever  having  seen  an- 
other one  escape  from  it.  "No  one,  I  am  sure,  who 
had  seen  them,  would  have  claimed  that  their  con- 
duct was  influenced  by  what  they  had  seen.  When 
they  did  hit  the  string,  the  act  looked  just  like  the 
accidental  success  of  the  ordinary  association  experi- 
ments." 2) 

Dogs,  too,  completely  failed  to  comprehend  the 
simple  idea  "that  what  gives  another  food  will  give  it 
to  them  also. ' ' 

No.  3,  for  instance,  had  been  found  to  be  unable 
to  escape  from  a  box  of  himself.  A  chance  was  given 
him  to  learn  it  from  No.  1.  No.  3  could  see  and 
study  every  move  of  No.  t.  And  yet  what  was  the 
result.  Here  is  the  record:  8) 

')  1.  c.,  p.  54. 

2)  I.e.,  p. 57. 

3)  1.  c.,p.  60. 


108 


THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 


Times 
No.  1  did  the 
action. 

Times  No.  3 
surely    saw 
the  action  of 
No.  1. 

Times  No.  3 
probably  saw 
the  action  of 
No.  1. 

Times  No.   3 
in  box 
alone. 

Result. 

30 

7 

14 

3  minutes. 

Failed. 

After  i    hour: 
35 

9 

14 

3  minutes. 

Failed. 

After    i   hour: 
10 

3 

3 

5  minutes. 

Failed. 

After  24  hours: 
20,  30 

6,  8 

8,  13 

6  minutes. 

Failed. 

After  48  hours: 
25,  25,  25 

8,  6,  9 

11,  12,  7 

8,  6,10min 

Failed. 

After  24  hours: 
30 

10 

11 

40  minutes 

Failed. 

Though  No.  3  saw  No.  i  surely  66  times,  it  failed 
in  all  cases.  Prof.  Thorndike  explains  many  similar 
experiments  most  minutely.  All  lead  to  the  same 
conclusion  that  even  the  highest  animals  are  absolutely 
incapable  of  understanding  the  finality  of  actions.  But 
Thorndike's  experiments  do  not  refer  only  to  cats, 
dogs  and  chicks.  In  a  special  monograph  1 )  on  the 
"mental  life"  of  three  South  American  monkeys  of 
the  genus  Cebus,  published  in  1901,  he  shows  clearly 
that  "a  negative  answer  to  the  question  'do  the 
monkeys  reason?'  seems  to  be  inevitable."  Very- 
many  simple  acts  similar  to  those  enumerated  above 
were  not  learned  by  the  monkeys  in  spite  of  again 
and  again  having  seen  them  performed  by  Thorndike 
and  by  their  own  kind.  Similarly,  "after  having 
abundant  opportunity  to  realize  that  one  signal  meant 

')  "The  Mental  Life  of  the  Monkeys."  The  Psycholo- 
gical Review.  Monograph  Supplement  No.  15. 


THE  INTELLIGENCE  OF  THE  "HIGHER  ANIMALS".    109 

food  at  the  bottom  of  the  cage  and  another  none,  a 
monkey  would  not  act  from  the  obvious  inference  and 
consistantly  stay  up  or  go  down  as  the  case  might  be, 
but  would  make  errors  such  as  would  be  natural  if  he 
acted  under  the  growing  influence  of  an  association 
between  sense  impression  and  idea,  but  quite  incom- 
prehensible if  he  had  compared  the  two  signals  and 
made  a  definite  inference.  V  Finally  "after  experience 
with  several  pairs  of  signals,  the  monkeys  yet  failed 
when  a  new  pair  was  used,  to  do  the  obvious  thing 
to  a  rational  mind;  viz,  to  compare  the  two,  think 
which  meant  food,  and  act  on  the  knowledge  directly. ' ' 
Certainly  animals  can  learn  to  perform  new  and  even 
complicated  actions,  but  only  if  one  succeeds  in  asso- 
ciating in  the  soul  of  each  individual  a  definite  im- 
pulse with  the  representation  of  a  definite  motion. 
Thus,  as  Wasmann  narrates  in  his  book  "Instinct  and 
Intelligence  in  the  Animal  Kingdom,"  x)  "L,ub- 
bock's  poodle  Van  finally  learnt  to  'read,'  by  being 
trained  to  fetch  the  card  with  the  word  when  it  was 
hungry. ' '  But  ' '  in  spite  of  its  long  course  of  training 
Van  often  brought  the  wrong  card,  when  it 
was  hungry.  This  fact  shows  that  it  never  un- 
derstood the  relation  between  the  graphic  symbols  and 
their  meaning.  Nor  did  it  occur  to  Van  to  give  'read- 
ing lessons'  to  Patience,  the  lap-dog.  Nor  did  Pa- 
tience hit  upon  the  idea  of  profiting  by  Van's  experi- 
ence, although  she  had  often  witnessed  the  reward 
which  Van  received  for  fetching  the  proper  card. ' ' 
Besides,  Mr.  A.  J.  Kinnman  2)  has  applied  Mr. 

»)  2  ed.  (Herder,  St.  Louis),  p.  165. 

2)  "Mental  Life  of  two  Macacus  Rhesus  Monkeys  in  cap- 
tivity," Amer  Journal  of  Psychology,  XIII.,  1902. 


110  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

Thorndike's  method  to  monkeys,  and  with  the  same 
result.  There  was  not  even  the  semblance  of  thought 
to  be  noticed;  less  adapted  methods  were  not  replaced 
by  more  improved  ones;  the  monkeys  did  not  experi- 
ment, did  not  know  how  to  make  use  of  favorable  cir- 
cumstances to  obtain  a  definite  end;  the  female  utterly 
failed  to  learn  by  imitating  the  male.  All  was  wild 
and  restless  activity  without  reflection. 

The  same  conclusion  is  reached  by  Mr.  Hob- 
house,  who  after  numerous  experiments  declares  that 
the  highest  animals  grasp  events  merely  in  concrete 
series,  so  far  as  they  are  relevant  to  immediate  practi- 
cal interests.  "Caution,  cunning  and  sagacity  of  the 
kind  which  'animal  stories'  are  so  full  do  not  as  a 
rule  imply  anything  more  or  less  than  the  "concrete 
experience,'  that  we  have  described."  Hobhouse 
explicitly  states  that  the  "world  of  ideas"  or  of  uni- 
versals  is  "the  distinctive  property  of  humanity."  x) 

Nor  can  examples  like  that-  of  "Clever  Hans"  be 
accepted  as  proofs  of  animal  intelligence.  It  is  true 
that  von  Osten's  famous  stallion  performed  actions 
that  seemed  to  manifest  a  degree  of  intelligence  per- 
haps never  recorded  of  any  other  animal.  But  a 
scientific  test  of  the  performances  of  Clever  Hans  has 
shown  that  they  must  be  explained  without  appealing 
to  any  reasoning  faculty.  Dr.  Stumpf,  president  of  the 
Psychological  Institute  of  Berlin,  writes  as  follows:  2) 

Clever  Hans  was  examined  experimentally  by  Dr. 
E.  von  Hornbostel,  O.  Pfungst,  and  myself.  The 
horse  was  at  our  disposal  even  in  the  case  of  his  own- 

')  Mind  in  Evolution,  p.  281,  p.  298. 

2)  E.  Wasmann,  Instinkt  und  Intelligenz,  3.  ed.,  p.  220. 


THE  INTELLIGENCE  OF  THE  "HIGHER  ANIMALS".    Ill 

er's  absence.  The  result  of  our  inquiry  is  as  follows: 
If  the  solution  of  a  problem  is  not  known  to  anyone 
present,  Hans  is  unable  to  find  it.  Hence  Hans  is  un- 
able to  count,  figure,  and  read  himself.  Moreover,  Hans 
is  unable  to  solve  a  problem,  if  he  cannot  see  the  persons 
who  know  the  solution  of  the  problem. l )  Hence,  Hans 
depends  on  optical  assistance.  But  this  assistance  is, 
in  the  present  case,  of  a  merely  instinctive  character. 
In  the  course  of  a  long  training  the  horse  has  become 
acquainted  with  the  slightest  changes  of  bodily  posi- 
tion, accompanying  the  thoughts  and  reasoning  of  his 
master.  Mr.  Pfungst,  whose  observing  powers  con- 
cerning very  short  impressions  of  sight  have  been  es- 
pecially well  developed  on  account  of  a  long  laboratory 
1 )  The  following  facts  originally  published  in  the  weekly 
edition  of  the  Koelnische  Volkszeitung  are  suggestive: 

1.  A  watch  was  presented  to   "clever  Hans."     Without 
conedscending  to  look  at  it,  he  immediately  gave  the  correct 
answer    by    stamping    eleven  times — it  happened  to   be  11 
o'clock.     I  repeat,   the   animal   did   not   even  glance  at  the 
watch. 

2.  Mr.  X,  who  was  among  the  spectators,  wrote  an  example 
of  arithmetic  on  a  slip  of  paper  in  such  a  way  that  no  one 
present,  not  ever  the  owner  of  the  horse,  knew  the  figures  of 
the  problem.     The  paper  was  then   presented   to   the   horse 
with  the  request  to  paw  the  solution.     The  animal  started 
pawing  ad  infinitum. 

3.  On  a  certain  wall  near  by   fourteen  boys  were  sitting  in 
two  rows.     Hans   was  asked   by   Mr.   Schillings   how    many 
boys  were  sitting  on  the  wall.     Without  really  looking  in  the 
direction  of  the  wall  and  counting,     Hans  pawed  fourteen 
times. 

4.  Another  time,  a  captain  of  the  army  gave  Hans  a  very 
simple  problem  in  addition,   but  made  sure  that  his  owner 
could    not    influence    the    horse.     Hans    failed   completely. 
Then  the  owner  got  hold  of  him,  and  lo!  Hans  solved  the 
problem  correctly.     (Koeln.  Volksz.  No.  36,  p.  S.)J 


112  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

training,  succeeded  in  analyzing  the  motions  which 
actually  caused  the  clever  answers  of  Hans.  In  fact, 
he  was  able  by  mere  motions  and  without  putting  any 
question  to  make  Hans  perform  anyone  of  his  former  ex- 
hibitions. Prof.  Stumpf  concludes  his  criticism  by 
stating  that  the  case  of  Hans  is  so  far  from  proving  the 
intelligence  of  animals  that  it  rather  proves  the  con- 
trary. For  if  not  even  the  training  powers  and  pati- 
ence of  a  man  like  von  Osten  are  capable  of  eliciting 
the  expression  of  a  single  concept  from  a  horse  like 
clever  Hans,  then,  indeed,  we  are  confronted  by  a  first 
class  proof  in  favor  of  the  old  and  general  opinion  that 
animals  are  devoid  of  intelligence. 

"The  animal's  self,"  as  Thorndike  himself  states, 
"is  not  a  being  'looking  after  and  before',  but  a  direct 
practical  association  of  feelings  and  impulses.  So  far 
as  experiences  come  continuously,  they  may  be  said  to 
form  a  continuous  mental  life,  but  there  is  no  contin- 
uity imposed  from  within. "  l ) 

This  is  the  reason  why  animals  have  never  invent- 

')  At  one  place  (p,  73)  Mr.  Thorndike  has  the  following 
very  interesting  sentence:  "Perhaps  the  entire  fact  of  asso- 
ciation in  animals  is  the  presence  of  sense  impressions  with 
which  are  associated  by  resultant  pleasure  certain  impulses, 
and  that  therefore,  and  therefore  only,  a  certain  situation 
brings  forth  a  certain  act."  If  Mr.  Thorndike  would  take 
the  trouble  to  study  Wasmann's  works,  he  would  find  that 
this  sentence,  correctly  understood,  has  ever  been  the  doc- 
trine of  scholastic  philosophy.  Of  course,  he  will  blame  that 
philosophy  for  not  being  able  to  support  its  statements  by 
experimental  facts  just  as  he  has  furnished  them.  But  is  it 
not  strange  that  the  old  scholastic  philosophers  arrived  at 
the  same  conclusions  as  Mr.  Thorndike,  though  they  merely 
relied  on  the  simple  facts  of  daily  experience? 


THE  INTELLIGENCE  OP  THE  ' '  HIGHER  ANIMALS' ' .    113 

ed  even  so  simple  a  tool  as  the  ancestors  of  the  human 
race  employed  during  the  so-called  stone-age  of  the 
Paleolithic  epoch,  this  the  reason  why  they  are  incap- 
able of  rational  language.  Parrots  may  be  trained  to 
utter  articulate  sounds  and  even  entire  phrases.  In 
general,  there  is  perhaps  no  class  of  animals  that  could 
not  furnish  a  great  many  external  signs  as  a  foundation 
for  intellectual  intercommunication.  But  the  invention 
of  tools  as  well  as  of  language  implies  the  knowledge 
of  the  universal,  which  is  the  "distinctive  property  of 
humanity. " 

CONCLUSION. 

Animals,  then,  do  not  possess  intelligence  in  its  gen- 
uine meaning.  They  are  mere  sense-beings.  But  this 
inevitably  leads  to  '  'the  admission  of  a  qualitive  differ- 
ence between  the  human  and  animal  psyche. ' '  For, 
as  we  have  proved  before,  the  specific  actions  of  man 
and  animal  are  essentially  different  from  each  other. 
Even  "plastic  instinct"  or  "simple  intelligence,"  as 
others  call  it,  is  but  a  material  faculty,  intrinsically  de- 
pendent on  the  nervous  system,  whereas  the  intellect 
with  its  true  intelligent  actions  is  of  an  immaterial,  a 
spiritual  nature.  Consequently,  there  is  an  essential,  a 
qualitative  difference  between  the  human  and  the  animal 
soul.  For,  as  a  being  acts,  so  it  is. 

Moreover,  it  is  equally  plain  that  we  must  reject  the 
supposition  of  Wundt  and  of  almost  all  modern  scient- 
ists, that  the  psychic  faculties  of  man  have  been  evolved 
from  the  psychic  faculties  of  the  animal.  Such  an  evolu- 
tion of  "mere  association"  to  "conscious  intellectual 
activity,"  x)  of  "nature"  to  "culture,"  x)  would  be 

1  )   Wilhelm  Wundt,    "Vorlesungen    ueber  die  Menschen 


114  THE  HUMANIZING  OF  THE  BRUTE. 

an  absolute  impossibility,  since  matter  and  sense  are  es- 
sentially inferior  to  spirit  and  intellect.  For  the  origin 
of  our  "intellectual  and  moral  faculties"  we  can  only 
find  "an  adequate  cause  in  the  unseen  universe  of 
Spirit."  2) 

und  Tierseele."  Hamburg  und  Leipzig,  1897,  3d  ed.,  p.  419. 
It  is  remarkable  that  Wundt  has  arrived  at  the  same  conclusions 
concerning  the  "intelligence  of  animals"  as  Thorndike. 
Wundt  even  considers  it  as  very  improbable  that  some  species 
or  individuals  of  the  present  animal  kingdom  will  ever  pass 
the  limit  separating  sense  and  intelligence;  on  the  other  hand, 
he  assumes,  as  we  have  stated,  that  the  human  species  in  the 
course  of  its  evolution  has  actually  taken  that  important  step! 
2)  Alfred  Russell  Wallace,  "Darwinism,"  Humboldt  ed. 
Part  IT.,  p.  322. 


UCSB   LIBRARY 


University  of  California 

SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 

405  Hilgard  Avenue,  Los  Angeles,  CA  90024-1388 

Return  this  material  to  the  library 

from  which  it  was  borrowed. 


01  APR  0? 


"    -,s  -u 


,liS.??.UJ.H.ERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 


A    000652104 


Universi 
Soutt 
Libi 


